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Preface 
In this study an attempt has been made to analyse problems 
of small enterprises in Uganda, and to describe measures already 
undertaken and those which could be undertaken to mitigate some 
of these problems. But as in economic growth, emphasis on what 
constitutes the main problems of small-scale enterprise is largely 
a matter of personal choice since the matters to be studied are 
so closely inter-related. This study concentrates primarily upon 
the financial problems facing small enterprises in Uganda. 
The main purpose of the study is to present a comprehensive 
survey of the main sources of funds available to small enterprises 
in Uganda and the problems and difficulties encountered by the 
small firm in these fields. The study is compounded of two 
elements. First, an effort has been made to draw upon the know-
ledge and experience of financial institutions which have taken 
special measures to meet the special financial problems facing the 
small firm in Uganda. Second, research was concentrated upon 
the results of a survey which was undertaken during the course 
of the study to determine the financial and other problems of 
small firms in Uganda. 
I am indebted to many people for help and guidance: my 
colleagues at the Institute, government officials and officials of 
other institutions and the many small businessmen without whose 
help and co-operation this study would have been well nigh 
impossible. But they are too many to mention them all here by 
name. However, my special acknowledgement is due to officials 
of the former Uganda Credit and Savings Bank, officials of the 
Development Division and the former African Business Promotion 
of the Uganda Development Corporation, and officials of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Special acknowledgement is 
also due to my three assistants: Miss A. Rehman and Messrs. L. 
Kyeyune and S. Lunyigo who carried out the tiring task of con-
ducting a survey with great patience and enthusiasm. 
I am specially indebted to Mr. W. T. Newlyn under whose 
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perceptive and interested guidance this study was prepared. He 
contributed invaluable criticisms and suggestions. 
However, any errors of fact or of reasoning are solely the 
responsibility of the author. 
Finally, I am indebted to my wife Kamni who helped me cheer-
fully and efficiently with tables, scissors and paste. 
For all these contributions, I am grateful. 
G E O R G E R. BOSA 





List of Tables ix 
I. THE ROLE A N D IMPORTANCE OF SMALL ENTER-
PRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . I 
Definition of Small-Scale Enterprise . . . . I 
The Role and Importance of Small Enterprises . . 3 
Problems of Small Enterprise . . . . . 7 
The financial problem 8 
Short-term credit 10 
Medium-term credit . . . . . . 10 
Long-term credit I I 
2. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS A N D SMALL ENTER-
PRISE IN UGANDA 13 
Functions of financial institutions . . . . 13 
The historical background of financial institutions in 
Uganda . . . . . . . . 14 
3. THE UGANDA CREDIT A N D SAVINGS BANK . 20 
Establishment of the UCSB 20 
Organization of the UCSB . . . . . 21 
Finances of the UCSB 22 
Loans . . . . . . . . . 24 
Applications . . . . . . . . 24 
Appraisal of loans 25 
Outstanding loans . . . . . . 26 
Repayments 26 
Analysis and Appraisal of Operations of the UCSB 28 
Management 29 
The Bank's costs of supplying loan funds . . . 32 
Reducing the costs of lending . . . . 33 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . 34 
4. THE FINANCING A N D PROMOTION OF SMALL 
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN UGANDA . . 45 
Establishment of the Small Industries Development 
Fund 45 
Contents 
Establishment of African Business Promotion Limited 46 
Finances of the African Business Promotion . . 47 
Operations of the SIDF and ABP . . . . 48 
Appraisal of loan applications (SIDF) . . . 48 
Appraisal of assistance to traders applications (ABP) . 50 
Facilities offered by the ABP 51 
The African Trade Development Section . . . 54 
Analysis and Appraisal of Operations of the SIDF and 
ABP 55 
Conclusions . . . . . . . 58 
5. RESULTS OF A SURVEY ON THE FINANCING OF 
SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE IN UGANDA . . 64 
Introduction 64 
The survey . . . . . . . . 64 
The Sample . . . . . . . . 65 
Selection . . . . . . . . 65 
Some Characteristics of the Sample . . . . 67 
Size 67 
Industry . . . . . . . . 68 
Other characteristics . . . . . . 69 
Rates of growth . . . . . . . 69 
Market structure . . . . . . . 70 
Age of business . . . . . . . 70 
Sources and Uses of Finance 70 
Present demand for funds . . . . . 74 
Conclusions . . . . . . . . 76 
6. THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEM . . . . 90 
The Sociology of Management of the Small Firm . 90 
The Management Training and Advisory Centre . . 94 
Organization of the Centre 95 




3.A Form of Application for Loan . . . . . 44 
5.A Survey of Financial Demand for Small-Scale Enterprises 
in Uganda, 1966 86 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103 
List of Tables 
I . I Returns Analysed by Size of Firm—Private Industry, 
All Industries 12 
3.1 The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank—Annual Balance 
Sheets . . . . . . . . . 37 
3.2 Savings Bank Accounts and Balance 31.12.51 to 30.6.65 38 
3.3 Applications Submitted 39 
3.4 Analysis of Outstanding Loans . . . . 40 
3.5 Purposes for which the Loans were Approved . . 41 
3.6 U.C.S.B. Statement of Loan Instalments Due but 
Unpaid 42 
3.7 Average Values and Direct Costs per Loan Account . 43 
4.1 African Business Promotion Limited—Annual Balance 
Sheets 60 
4.2 Schedule of Payments 61 
4.3 Small Industries Development Fund—Performance 
Record . . . . . . . . 62 
4.4 ABP Performance Record 63 
5.1 a Composition of Sample by Industry . . . . 79 
5.1b Composition of Sample by Industry and Number 
Employed . . . . . . . . 80 
5.2 Size Distribution of Firms in the Sample . . . 81 
5.3 Consolidated Size Distribution of Firms in the Sample 82 
5.4 Composition of the Sample by Racial Ownership . 83 
5.5 Opinions on the Strength of Competition . . 83 
5.6 Date of Foundation of Business . . . . 83 
5.7 Sources and Uses of Funds . . . . . 84 
5.7a Single Proprietorships . . . . . . 85 
1 
The Role and Importance of Small 
Enterprises in Developing Countries 
This study analyses financial problems which beset small 
enterprises in Uganda. For outside agriculture, it is the small 
enterprise which offers the only form of economic activity in which 
the indigenous people of Uganda primarily engage. Moreover, 
Africanization is one of the basic policy objectives in this country. 
Hence the interests of the study are not only economic but political 
as well. In fact, in many instances, small enterprise will here be 
used synonymously with African enterprise. 
Definition of Small-Scale Enterprise 
Though in order to have a reasonable base of discussion, a 
definition of the term "small-scale enterprise" is necessary, there 
is no one single measure of small-scale enterprise which is perfectly 
satisfactory. Even the concept of "small-scale industry" also 
"lacks precision and its definition varies from country to 
country — at times, from agency to agency in the same 
country — according to the amount or type of capital or 
assets of the industry, the number of its employees, the volume 
or value of its output or any combination of these criteria. 
In practice, there is little need for a commonly agreed defini-
tion, as the choice or combination of criteria would vary with 
the end pursued; thus a definition of small-scale industry for 
fiscal purposes — for example, to determine tax rates, 
exemptions or abatements — need not be identical with that 
establishing eligibility for membership in an organization, 
such as a co-operative association."1 
For the purposes of this study, however, the expression "small-
scale enterprise" is preferable to "small-scale industries" because 
manufacturing enterprises, as well as personal servicing firms, 
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retail and wholesale trading, transport and distributive enterprises, 
play a very important role in developing countries. After all, the 
distribution of African enterprises outside agriculture reflects the 
relative capital and skills required for various types of economic 
activity. By far the greatest number of African enterprises are in 
retail distribution which, along with service trades, requires the 
smallest capital, makes the simplest demands on technical and 
managerial capabilities, and is closest to traditional occupations. 
In Uganda alone, for instance, there are estimated to be some 
18,000 licensed and unlicensed retailers. Such a profusion of small 
entrepreneurs is a feature of most developing countries though 
these traders are often too many for their ventures to be profitable. 
Nevertheless entrepreneurship itself signifies three things. In the 
first place it signifies the ability to imagine and perceive a chance 
of profit and to convince oneself of its reality; in the second place, 
it involves the capacity and willingness to realize this chance by 
means of a project; and third and most important, it involves a 
wish to make a profit, but also an awareness of the responsibility 
for failure and the chance to lose the property linked to the pro-
ject, or briefly: the readiness to risk one's own fortune for the 
chance of making profits. 
A small enterprise will therefore be understood to be an under-
taking for the purpose of profit and conducted on a whole time 
basis. Hence this study will not include handicraft and cottage 
industries, whose problems are unlike those of small factory enter-
prise, since their operations are not entirely motivated by purely 
economic considerations. Nor will the study include agricultural 
enterprises whose financial problems are the subject of study 
elsewhere.2 
In functional terms, small-scale enterprise is often identifiable 
with a number of such characteristics as lack of specialization in 
organization and management, close personal contact between the 
manager and clients of the business, lack of access to capital 
markets, lack of dominant position in the market, and a relatively 
close integration with the local community. The manager of a 
small-scale enterprise is often his own production, purchasing, 
marketing, finance and personnel expert, as well as expert in any 
other aspects of the undertaking. He often has a close personal 
contact not only with his employees but also with his customers, 
suppliers and owners — though ownership and management are 
often identical. These and other characteristics often offer a handy 
method of identifying small businesses whether in developed or 
developing countries. 
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However, since size is a major factor in this study, and since 
it is often desirable to make some sort of statistical — especially 
international — comparisons, a quantitative definition is clearly 
called for. And for comparative purposes, it is the employment 
measure which has invariably been selected in most countries as 
the most suitable measure of size. Such other measures as pro-
ductivity, output, value added, etc., usually have to be abandoned 
since institutional factors in various countries have such a marked 
influence on production functions. 
In many under-developed countries a small-scale enterprise is 
usually defined as one employing fewer than one hundred workers. 
In Uganda, however, small-scale enterprise is very small indeed. 
In a survey which was carried out during the course of this study, 
it was found useful to include, unless otherwise specified, only 
those firms employing fewer than fifty people. But since this is 
a study on finance, it was also found useful to define small enter-
prises in financial terms. 
The category of small enterprises was therefore limited to enter-
prises with a capital investment of less than £50,000. 
The Role and Importance of Small Enterprises 
At first glance the role of small enterprises in a context of 
developing countries calling for rapid industrialization may seem 
obscure beside big industrial projects running into several millions 
of pounds. However, at a second glance and in the course of 
everyday experience one becomes aware that for every large factory 
there are hundreds of small workshops making furniture and other 
wooden articles, pottery, shoes, repairing bicycles, making clothes, 
lamps, burning charcoal, boiling soap, or a host of other com-
mercial, transport or personal service activities. Even in developed 
countries, where big firms have tended to grow continually bigger, 
small firms have continued to exist and set up in business. Thus, 
of the 4,755,000 businesses which were accounted for in the United 
States in 1953 when the Small Business Administration was first 
set up, 95 per cent, or more than 4,500,000 businesses were small 
businesses.3 Though these figures included some businesses em-
loying 2504 workers, in 1958 the Census of Manufacturers showed 
that out of a total of nearly 300,000 manufacturing establishments, 
only 26,500 establishments employed more than 99 employees.3 
Again, as far as manufacturing industries are concerned, this level 
of incidence of small units — employing less than 100 workers — has 
been observed to be almost universal in developed or developing 
countries. Thus, the proportion is 89 per cent in West Germany, 
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91 per cent in Puerto Rico, 95 per cent in the United Kingdom, 
97 per cent in Australia and 99 per cent in Japan.6 
In Uganda, out of 3,440 private firms accounted for in 1965, 
more than 92 per cent or 3,168 firms employed 100 workers or 
less (see Table 1.1). These firms employed 32 per cent or 46,941 
workers out of a total employment of 146,694 workers. In terms 
of estimated annual cash wage bill, these firms were responsible 
for 38.6 per cent or £9,336,000 out of a total cash wage bill of 
£24,236,000. 
In terms of employment, this state of affairs is not radically 
different from that of highly industrialized countries. In manufac-
turing industries in Japan, small units employ 34 per cent of the 
total work force,7 and in the United States8 and West Germany,9 
the proportion is around 27 per cent. 
Thus whatever interpretation is put on these figures there would 
seem to be little doubt that the role of small enterprise is consider-
able in most countries, irrespective of their state of development. 
Small enterprise typically comprises over 90 per cent of all busi-
ness establishments; it is responsible for employing about one-
third of the total labour force; and notwithstanding the greater 
productivity of large industrial undertakings, small enterprises 
are usually responsible for around 30 per cent of gross output. 
Thus irrespective of the state of development, small enterprises 
have a major contribution to make to economic life. 
The universality of the role of small enterprise is explainable 
in terms of a whole complex of factors among which limitations 
of product and factor markets and dis-economies of small-scale 
have been recognized as limiting factors to the size of the firm 
and are quite familiar in the usual economics textbook. The nature 
of demand for the products or services of small enterprise is often 
conducive to or permissive of smallness. Thus, total demand for a 
particular product or service might be quite small in a particular 
country or local area, and the smallness of total demand, ipso 
facto, must be met by smallness of capacity for its production. 
Geographical conditions of a country or local area might also set 
severe limitations on the extent of a firm's operations because of 
transport costs — this state of affairs being conducive to or per-
missive of small local productive units known as "spatial mono-
polies". 
Indeed, in such highly differentiated and fashion conscious in-
dustries as the clothing industries or hair-dressing services, small-
ness of the productive unit is the rule rather than the exception. 
Again in the books and periodicals industry there is also to be 
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found a number of products which are sharply differentiated from 
one another but with a limited amount of substitutability and 
often comparatively small markets. Here, too, smallness of the 
productive unit is the rule rather than the exception. 
A number of other factors such as technological considerations 
or the nature of the raw materials also favour smallness in manu-
facturing industries. If, for instance, the raw material is liable to 
deteriorate with transport and /o r storage, and its production is 
geographically well-spread (as in the case of milk and its products) 
industrial units (such as pasteurization and bottling plants) are 
likely to be small. On the other hand, economies of scale are 
exhausted at a very early stage in several industrial processes 
where there are no major technical indivisibilities involved, or 
where these are not very significant in terms of investment and 
cost. Thus in the clothing and leather-footwear industries, although 
economies of organization and marketing may be achieved by 
combining the output of lots of similar sewing machines or leather 
shoe-machines, there is no opportunity for securing the kinds of 
economies of scale such as are involved in large cement plants 
and blast furnaces. 
These and several other factors have been mentioned in 
economic literature stressing the importance of the role of small 
enterprises in the economic life of a country. But in developing 
countries, several governments have in their statements of objec-
tives, policies and programmes, given additional weight to the 
importance of small enterprises. In Uganda for instance, 
"The Government is taking an increasing interest in aiding 
small industries and commercial ventures by Ugandans, so 
that a multiplicity of small enterprises should flourish along-
side large-scale industry. Such small concerns, taken together, 
have a major part to play in creating a varied industrial and 
commercial economy. Some may even evolve into industrial 
giants of the future."10 
Moreover, in an important policy speech in Parliament in June 
1965, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. C. J. 
Obwangor, said that . . . "the most pressing problem in Uganda 
was to increase the effective participation of Africans in busi-
ness. . . ." The Ministry would help African men and women to 
participate in and establish small-scale industries. With this system 
he said . . . "adequate development of small-scale industries should 
be achieved".11 
Thus among the principal reasons for which African govern-
ments attach such paramount importance to the development of 
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small enterprises is the desire to give a new and broader signi-
ficance to the concept of Africanization. In this broader sense, 
Africanization is viewed as the building up of new indigenous 
undertakings in major economic activities which so far have been 
dominated by foreign or expatriate interests. No self-respecting 
Government would leave such racial imbalances as are observable 
in the fields of industry, trade and commerce in many parts of 
Africa go uncorrected. For mere political freedom (in the sense 
of an indigenous government in place of an alien one) without 
economic advancement of all sections of the population would be 
untenable. But while modern large-scale industry offers very 
limited opportunities for employment, small-scale enterprise offers 
not only greater employment opportunities but also an excellent 
training ground for the masses of the population. As a recent 
United Nations report on Industrial Estates has stressed: 
"Provided guidance, assistance, training and support are 
given, small-scale industries can be set up by people from 
all walks of life, with small financial resources, little or no 
technical and management experience, and beginning opera-
tion with relatively unskilled labour. These characteristics are 
predominantly those of the indigenous group of the popula-
tion of African countries. By promoting small-scale industries, 
particularly by means of industrial estates, a breakthrough 
of the indigenous entrepreneur into industrial activities and 
his participation in the industrialization of his country can 
be achieved."12 
Apart from providing a good training ground for management 
and labour, small enterprises also lend themselves to the use of 
labour-intensive methods of production, that is, of techniques 
characterized by a low capital-labour ratio. This is an important 
consideration in developing countries which have scarce capital 
and abundant labour. Thus, in Uganda a general principle is 
"whenever there is a choice of production methods, and the more 
capital-intensive method offers no advantage in lower costs or 
easier financing, the more labour-intensive method should be 
used."13 
Again, in Uganda the rate of growth in employment by big 
industry has been disappointing over the last decade.1'' Thus owing 
partly to steadily increasing productivity in big industry, the total 
paid labour force in large manufacturing industries was virtually 
the same in 1964 as it was in 1956 despite the increasing volume 
of production over the period.15 However, of the present target of 
100,000 jobs expected to be created during the Plan period, 15 per 
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cent or 15,000 jobs are expected to be created in the fields of 
construction, transport and commerce alone. Another 20,000 to 
25,000 jobs are likely to be created in the field of small manufac-
turing industries. Remembering that big industry is not likely to 
require a large labour force of not too high a level of skill, it 
becomes clear what a vital role small enterprises are going to play 
in the future economic life of this country. It is the small enter-
prises which will provide employment especially to the lower 
salaried worker whose importance is, however, likely to decline 
with the spread of education. It is the small enterprises which 
will provide the vehicle to the masses of the people enabling them 
to realize their ambitions with their own efforts, and to improve 
their welfare and economic and social status. 
To summarize, then, it is clear, that in all economies small 
enterprises are part of the normal economic spectrum and not 
just an inefficient segment of the economy to be tolerated only 
so long as larger enterprises cannot be established. The argument 
could perhaps be taken even a step further and at least under 
conditions of a mixed economy, the small enterprises sector might 
be regarded as vital to efficiency. In African countries especially, 
the development of indigenous small enterprises is not only an 
effective way of contributing to the diversification and development 
of the economy and increase in living standards, it is also one of 
the principal means of achieving social and political objectives 
of crucial importance to societies which have just emerged from 
colonialism to independent nationhood. 
Problems of Small Enterprises 
But small enterprises are beset with several major problems. 
The ease with which an individual or group of individuals may 
enter a trade or small industry is accompanied by an equally high 
death rate. In developed and developing countries several thous-
ands of small businesses are set up every year. But several 
thousands of individuals and small companies also go bankrupt 
every year. In Britain, for instance, some 2,000 private individuals 
go bankrupt each year, and a further 300 to 400 small companies 
are compulsorily liquidated.16 In the United States in the 1950's, 
out of 3J million businesses, 250 failed every week and it was 
estimated that four out of every five enterprises disappeared within 
a decade.17 In Uganda, out of some 18,000 registered and unre-
gistered "dukas" at least something like 2,000 shops quietly close 
down every year. Although big firms also face a number of diffi-
culties, the incidence of such a high death rate among the small 
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firms indicates that the small firms face special risks. 
In developing, as in developed, countries, both the establish-
ment and operation of small enterprise is hampered by such things 
as the insufficiency of technological and managerial knowledge, 
the scarcity of financial resources, the inadequate skill of labour, 
lack of information on markets, lack of basic education, institu-
tional rigidities, etc. In Africa in particular, most Africans in-
terested in setting up small enterprises lack one or all of the 
necessary qualifications, namely, managerial ability, technical 
skill, and capital. In Uganda, for instance, the opportunities that 
exist in small service type industries up-country are almost ex-
clusively taken up by Asians. Asians run the garages, the bakeries, 
the better quality furniture shops, the profitable sawmills, the oil 
mills, most of the maize mills. It is the Asian that makes most 
of the shoes, does the welding and blacksmithing, does the radio 
repairs, makes the candy, does the printing. In the main towns, 
over 95 per cent of the trading shops are also owned by Asians 
or Europeans. 
It is difficult, although certainly not impossible, for Africans to 
compete with these established businesses. The African entre-
preneur must acquire skills of effective management to the level 
of his opposite number in established businesses. He must, in 
addition, understand the environment in which he operates, its 
development needs and plans, and the process of rapid change in 
contemporary African society. In other words, in spite of his 
general lack of basic education and technical skills, the African 
entrepreneur is expected not only to apply modern management 
techniques but also to devise a solution to some problems peculiar 
to his present African environment. 
These are some of the problems which make up the special 
risks of small enterprises in general, and those which, in addition, 
apply to Africa in particular. 
The Financial Problem: Among all the problems confronting small 
enterprises, few have proved to be as difficult to solve as those 
of financing. Even in the more advanced countries, "the private 
firm or partnership and the small enterprise generally are still in 
difficulty when they need long-term capital; and efforts to meet 
their need have not yet achieved any substantial measure of 
success."18 
Besides the problem of long-term credit only some of these 
countries have begun to solve the problem of medium-term credit 
for small enterprises. This is shown by the recent establishment 
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(sometimes with government assistance) of such specialist institu-
tions as the Small Business Administration in the United States; 
the Instituti Regionali de Credito a Medio termine per le Piccole 
Industrie or the Instituto Centrale de medio credito in Italy; the 
Caisse Nationale de Credit Professionnel in Belgium; the Banque 
Neerlandaise pour les Classes Moyennes in Holland; the Caisse 
Centrdle de Credit Hotelier, Commercial et Industrie!; the Banques 
Populates pour l'Artisanat and the Caisse Centrale de Credit 
Cooperatij in France; the Industriekreditbank or the Kreditanstalt 
fiir Wiederaufbau in Germany; the Fincmsierings Institutten fiir 
Industri og Hanvaerku A/S in Denmark, etc. 
In these countries, however, the provision of short-term finance 
for small enterprises is not a problem because a lot has already 
been done in this regard. The ordinary banking system in these 
countries supplies normal short-term credit requirements through 
the normal conventional channels, generally on quite normal 
terms. 
But in under-developed countries the problem of finance for 
small enterprises is much more intractable applying as it does 
even to short-term. In Uganda, for instance, not even short-term 
funds are easily available to the small entrepreneur especially if 
he happens to be an African entrepreneur. The social, economic, 
financial, legislative, political and banking systems characteristic 
of the colonial regime have all combined to make the financial 
problem for small African enterprises in countries like Uganda 
particularly difficult. 
James Bates has defined the problem of finance for small enter-
prise as follows: 
"Put at its crudest the financial problem of the small firm 
is that of finding funds for expansion at the right time or the 
right type, and in the right quantities at various stages of 
development. All firms, even the giants of private industry 
and the nationalised industries, have problems of some sort 
with finance; but big firms have access to sources denied to 
the smaller and medium-sized concerns and they frequently 
have specialized finance departments which give them further 
advantages."19 
Bates also identifies three special difficulties facing small enter-
prise in this regard. First, the small firm may not be able to 
demonstrate its chances of success in order to persuade potential 
lenders even though many large firms also face this problem; 
second, the existing lending and financial institutions may not 
cater for the special problems involved in small business finance; 
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third the businessman and his advisers may not know how or 
where to get the money.19 
In the following foul chapters, we are going to examine the 
problem of finance for small enterprises in all its ramifications in 
the context of Uganda, giving particular consideration to African 
enterprise. In the following chapter, we shall briefly examine some 
principles of financial institutions and their policies of lending in 
order to find out how the policies and practices of financial institu-
tions have related to small enterprise in Uganda. In Chapters 
Three and Four, we shall examine various experiments which 
have been tried or are in progress in Uganda in order to assess 
their successes and failures. In Chapter Five, we shall examine 
the results of a survey which was carried out in order to determine 
the financial experience of small enterprises in Uganda. Finally, 
some conclusions will be drawn in Chapter Six and an attempt 
to assess the present and future financial prospects of small enter-
prises in Uganda will be made. 
But before we turn to these matters, it will be necessary to 
clarify a few terms which are likely to occur again and again in 
the discussion. As has been already suggested in regard to loan 
finance, a distinction is usually made between (a) short-term credit, 
(b) medium-term credit and (c) long-term credit. 
(a) Short-term credit: These are loans which are at least 
theoretically due for repayment within a short time. The loans 
may be granted for an indefinite period but are liable to be called 
in on short notice. 
This form of credit is granted to cover working capital require-
ments in the normal operation of firms and is usually in the form 
of overdrafts on current accounts, the discounting of drafts nor-
mally within a period of thirty to ninety days, the grant of 
maximum credits, and special or seasonal concessions to enable 
firms to meet particular contingencies, as determined by the eco-
nomic activity of the firms. 
As already mentioned, in the developed countries short-term 
credit is standard service rendered by banks to enterprises of all 
sizes, though within the limits of the customer's credit rating with 
the bank in question. 
(b) Medium-term credit: These are loans normally granted to 
finance investments in equipment, in particular machinery and 
plant, and sometimes in stock. 
This is regarded as the most important credit for the small firm, 
for it is on this credit that the possibilities of transformation, rein-
forcement, and renewal are substantially dependent. It may some-
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times be granted by the traditional banks or sometimes by special 
institutions or organizations. But these matters will be discussed 
later. 
Its duration may range from two or three years to six or seven 
years, though it must not be longer than ten years. 
(c) Long-term credit: These loans are generally for investments 
in land and buildings and equipment and, consequently, they may 
be granted for periods of ten, fifteen, twenty or even thirty years 
and over. These loans, however, may also be used for investments 
in movable assets of a business. 
Although they may be critical for necessary expansion, long-
term credit programmes for small firms are the most difficult to 
establish, since the fate of the enterprise may not solely be de-
pendent on the capacity of the entrepreneur. 
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No. 3, p. 39. 
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in O.E.C.D. Conference on Collective Actions Taken by Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises to Adapt Themselves to New Market 
Conditions (Paris, September 1964) Report 2, Annex V, p. 43. 
4. "Small businesses" in the United States are defined as : any in-
dustrial firm employing less than 250 persons; any wholesaler whose 
annual turnover does not exceed $5,000,000; any dealer whose 
turnover is less than $1,000,000. 
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Year Plan 1966-1971 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1966) p. 15. 
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17. E. A. J. Johnson and Herman E. Krooss, The American Economy 
(Englewood Cliffs: N. J. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1960) footnote p. 245. 
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Table I.I 
RETURNS ANALYSED BY SIZE OF FIRM 
PRIVATE INDUSTRY ALL INDUSTRIES 
Size 
Number of 





No. V /o No. /o £'000 % 
0 — 4 1,096 31.9 2,752 1.9 532 2 . 2 
5 — 10 861 25 .0 6,079 4 .1 1,261 5 .2 
11 — 20 524 15.2 7,808 5 .3 1,807 7 .5 
21 — 30 213 6 . 2 5,199 3 .5 1,187 4 . 9 
31 40 159 4 . 6 5,593 3 .8 1,162 4 . 8 
41 — 50 102 3 .0 4,587 3.1 967 4 . 0 
51 — 60 72 2.1 3,994 2 .7 682 2 .8 
61 — 70 44 1.3 2,770 2 .0 364 1.5 
71 — 80 45 1.3 3,364 2 .3 599 2 .5 
81 — 90 32 .9 2,806 1.9 416 1.7 
91 — 100 20 .6 1,899 1.3 359 1 .5 
101 — 150 98 2 .8 12,157 8 .3 1,775 7 .3 
151 — 200 49 1.4 8,434 5 .7 1,144 4 .7 
201 — 300 49 1.4 12,162 8 .3 1,392 5 .7 
301 — 400 25 .7 8,511 5 .8 1,016 4 . 2 
401 — 500 12 .3 5,373 3.7 889 3 .7 
501 — 700 10 .3 5,881 4 . 0 1,018 4 . 2 
701 — 1,000 10 .3 8,198 5 .6 1,239 5.1 
Over 1,000 19 .6 36,037 26.6 6,426 26.5 
TOTAL 33,440 100.0 146,694 100.0 24,236 100.0 
Source: Enumeration of Employees, June 1965. 
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Financial Institutions and Small 
Enterprise in Uganda 
Functions of Financial Institutions. Broadly speaking, it is 
possible to distinguish three functions which the financial sector 
performs. First it serves as an intermediary between savers and 
investors. This function can also usefully be subdivided into two 
components. In the first place, financial institutions serve as re-
servoirs for the accumulated liquid savings of the community; and 
in the second place, these institutions direct or allocate those 
savings among alternative investment opportunities. Second, the 
financial sector may supply part or all of the circulating media 
or means of payment. And third, it may supply initiative and 
enterprise for the creation, transformation or expansion of indust-
rial and commercial ventures. 
In a developing — and indeed in any other monetary — eco-
nomy, the financial sector may perform these functions with 
greater or lesser efficiency. It may, for instance, stimulate or en-
courage the saving of a larger proportion of the national income 
than would otherwise be the case, or it may conceivably depress 
the level of real saving. It may direct savings into highly produc-
tive investments or into inefficient and wasteful ones or into no 
investment at all. It may provide a "sound" or stable means of 
payment, or an erratic and unstable circulating medium. It may 
actively encourage and foster new industrial or commercial ven-
tures, big or small, or it may stifle and repress them by with-
holding capital and credit. 
With this theoretical framework in mind we can now turn briefly 
to the record of performance of financial institutions in East 
Africa in general and Uganda in particular in order to evaluate 
financial structures in Uganda in terms of their contribution to 
the development of small-scale enterprise, and African enterprise 
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in particular. But the historical background which has given shape 
to these institutions can only be reviewed very briefly!1 
The Historical Background of Financial Institutions in Uganda. 
Although the monetary and financial system of any country reflects 
the political, economic, and even the social structure of that 
country, the most important single determinant of the character 
of the system in East Africa was the political background of these 
territories. At different dates during the latter part of the last 
century and the first quarter of this century the four East African 
territories had become dependencies of Britain. 
On assuming political control, the British Government adopted 
the policy of encouraging the settlement of expatriates in these 
territories. Uganda, for instance, had been marked out to provide 
an outlet for Indian enterprise and emigration as early as 1901. 
"On account of our Indian Empire we are compelled to re-
serve to British control a large portion of East Africa. Indian 
trade, enterprise, and emigration require a suitable outlet. 
East Africa is, and should be, from every point of view, the 
America of the Hindu."2 
In addition, Europeans were required as administrators, settler 
farmers (especially in Kenya and Tanganyika), skilled technicians 
and businessmen. Even in Uganda where African land rights have 
been preserved since 1920, the Chief Secretary had declared it 
to be the policy of the Government in that year "to encourage 
European settlement and the investment of capital in every 
possible way."3 
In October 1921, however, the same Chief Secretary had 
changed his views as follows: "As regards crops in Uganda I 
consider the best policy is for the natives to grow these and for 
the Europeans to purchase and to market them. This is, I believe, 
the Director of Agriculture's view, and it has proved to be the 
correct one."4 The implication in this policy statement that Afri-
can enterprise outside agriculture would not be encouraged was 
accompanied by positive discouragement in practice: "the official 
policy of Government was to discourage development and to 
retain the African population in its old tribal ways. Active people 
with initiative and a willingness to push their ideas and schemes 
were disliked with an intensity that it is hard to believe today."5 
But the East African territories were not only politically de-
pendent upon Britain, they were also economically dependent on 
Britain and the rest of the world. Any territory which relies upon 
the proceeds of exports for income and upon imports for the 
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expenditure of that income, can be defined as economically de-
pendent. A very large proportion of East Africa's agricultural 
products is exported abroad but the prices of these exports as well 
as East Africa's imports are determined by conditions prevailing 
elsewhere in the world. 
As would be expected in these circumstances, indigenous enter-
prise grew up slowly and only to a limited extent in these territo-
ries. The market economy grew up only slowly and did not in-
volve more than a small percentage of the population on a full-
time continuous basis. The major portion of the population 
remained engaged in agricultural and pastoral activities, a major 
part of which was for subsistence purposes. 
Consequently, there grew up in these territories a relatively 
simple monetary system which was designed primarily to serve 
the needs of expatriates and was centred around the financing of 
the movement of agricultural exports and import trade, and around 
credit institutions which established business in East Africa, main-
tained close relationships with London and were modelled upon 
British banking institutions. Their policies, practices and attitudes 
were therefore largely imported from Britain. 
In regard to this last point, it is interesting to note that the 
East African Currency Board which was established in 1919 and 
whose members and secretary were to be appointed by the Sec-
retary of State for the Colonies, also had its headquarters in 
London. The function of the Board as laid down in the regula-
tions, was to "issue at their main offices in the Constituent Territo-
ries to any person who makes demand in that behalf, currency 
notes or coin equivalent to the value (at the rate of twenty East 
African Shillings to One Pound Sterling) of sums in sterling 
lodged with the Board in London. The Board shall pay to any 
person who makes demand in that behalf sterling in London 
equivalent to the value (calculated as aforesaid) of currency notes 
or coin lodged with the Board at their main offices in the Consti-
tuent Territories".6 
Thus as the functions of the Board were purely administrative 
ones of automatic issue and redemption of local currency for 
sterling and vice versa, on demand, and the transfer of funds 
between London and East Africa and between East African 
centres, it dealt only in sterling and East African currency. Con-
sequently the foreign reserves of East Africa were entirely sterling 
reserves and the acquisition and sale of other foreign currencies 
by banks on behalf of East African customers were reflected only 
in a rise and fall respectively in sterling reserves of the economy. 
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"The East African currency had therefore no independent inter-
national standing of its own under the strict Currency Board 
arrangements, and until recently the East African Governments 
had no separate quota with the International Monetary Fund, but 
as non-self-governing territories were covered by the quota of the 
United Kingdom. Furthermore the East African Exchange Control 
Legislation was almost identical with that of the United 
Kingdom."7 
Hence the operations of the East African Currency Board 
perhaps more than fulfilled at least one of the basic functions 
expected of the financial sector. By pegging local currency to 
sterling, the Board succeeded in providing the East African terri-
tories with a highly "sound" or stable means of payment. It can 
even be speculated that this function was probably fulfilled too 
efficiently to actively encourage and foster new industrial ventures 
in these territories. For it is a striking fact that there are many 
examples on record of rapid and successful industrialization which 
has taken place in spite of a not-too-"sound" or even a grossly 
deficient or badly disorganized hand-to-hand circulation. The 
"wildcat banks" for instance, so-called because they located their 
redemption offices in such inaccessible spots "that only a wildcat 
could find them," account for some of the most colourful anec-
dotes. But despite the numerous crises and financial disasters 
which resulted, it can scarcely be doubted that the rapidity of 
American economic growth and industrialization in the nineteenth 
century owes much to the restless spirits who did not shrink from 
devising radical and untried instruments to cope with what they 
regarded as an intolerable shortage of money. Though this is not 
to suggest that we should have adopted the same practices here, 
perhaps the risk has been rated too high and we ought to have 
taken a little more risk. 
Instead, however, until recently the commercial banks had not 
begun playing any significant role in financing indigenous enter-
prises. Newlyn and Rowan writing in the early 1950's found that 
in the whole of East and Central Africa there was hardly any 
financial institution which catered for African enterprise. Even 
within the field of agriculture, the only field in which African 
enterprise was bound to be especially important for the future 
development of these territories, there was hardly any financial 
institution which was willing to supply long- or medium-term 
credit in that sector.*® Rather the foreign banks tended to reserve 
their funds for expatriate export and import trade requirements. 
H. L. Engerberg writing as recently as February 1964 says: "It 
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is indeed hard to escape the conclusion that the borrowing needs 
of agriculture have been somewhat neglected by the banks which 
have shown a more intense interest in commercial lending."9 
Though in fact this is the case in most countries where special 
institutions have been created to cater for agricultural needs, it 
is worse in Africa because of land tenure problems. 
Still, Dr. Loxley explains this state of affairs for the period up 
to 1950 as follows: 
". . . commercial banks never pretended that their raison 
d'etre was to cater for the needs of the African community. 
They were primarily established to finance credit needs of 
expatriate farmers, traders, and businessmen . . . Finally 
the very nature of [British] bank lending policy will always 
favour short-term advances to industry and commerce since 
the right type of security is almost always forthcoming and 
advances are virtually self liquidating. Long-term credit re-
quirements of agriculture are not regarded by banks as being 
their type of business. . ."10 
Since the commercial banks looked upon themselves as 
expatriate organizations catering for the needs of expatriates, they 
adopted standards and terms of banking business which in general 
resembled "very closely [to] the standards employed in England 
. . . . In general the types of security acceptable to banks in East 
Africa are mortgages, all-money debentures, pledged shares, bank de-
posits, life insurance policies, directors' guarantees and bills of collec-
tion; . . .".H In practice this meant that Africans were effectively 
barred from obtaining any credit from banks. For, as far as the 
banks were concerned, the sectors demanding the "right type" of 
credit — namely short-term, virtually self liquidating and low 
risk credit — were largely in the hands of expatriates. 
In Kenya and Tanganyika in particular up to the time of 
independence 
"almost all lending was confined to expatriates. Africans were 
effectively discouraged from seeking credit and perhaps 
effectively barred from obtaining it if they did seek it, by the 
Credit to Africans (Control) Ordinance of Kenya imposed in 
1948 and by the Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance of 
Tanganyika imposed in 1931. These obliged Africans to 
obtain written permission from administrative officers (usually 
District Commissioners) before entering into debt contract 
with non-Africans. . . . In practice it prevented Africans from 
obtaining credit by leaving the decision to the District Com-
missioner who in Tanganyika could even impose his own 
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conditions."12 
Indeed this Tanganyika Ordinance proved so effective right up to 
the time of independence that in 1960 Mr. Muhanna advocated 
its repeal "so that Africans may be able to get finance facilities 
for commerce, agriculture and other enterprises."13 
It should by now be clear that though the banking institutions 
have made some very valuable contributions to the economies of 
East Africa by financing the valuable export and import trade and 
commerce and by providing for crop finance, their contribution 
to the financing of small — particularly African — enterprises has 
been negligible. They have tended to reserve their funds for ex-
patriate businesses and local branches and subsidiaries of foreign 
firms. In Uganda where commercial banks have made some con-
tribution in the financing of expatriate small enterprises, their 
contribution to African small enterprise has been negligible. In-
digenous small enterprise still suffers from a shortage even of 
working capital. 
Apart from banking institutions, other financial institutions such 
as insurance companies, building societies, hire purchase com-
panies and investment trusts were also not only owned by and 
designed to cater for expatriate interests, their policies and opera-
tions were even more sophisticated to be of much help to African 
entrepreneurs. Worse still, banking and finance has all along been 
the smallest field of activity for African entrepreneurs not only 
in East Africa but also elsewhere in Africa south of the Sahara 
and north of the Limpopo. 
This then has been the kind of financial institutional background 
which small enterprise, especially African small enterprise, has 
had to grapple with. Up to 1950 in Uganda as elsewhere in East 
and Central Africa, there was a serious gap in the structure of 
financial institutions — a gap that badly needed to be filled. In-
deed the Uganda Government was among the first pioneers to 
initiate programmes designed to protect, stimulate and assist in-
digenous enterprise in particular. Since the early 1950's the 
Uganda Government has initiated various financing schemes for 
small enterprise; and these government sponsored sources of 
finance for small enterprise will now be examined in the next two 
chapters. 
1. For a fuller review and discussion see Dr. John Loxley, "The 
Development of the Monetary and Financial System of the East 
African Currency Area 1950 to 1964" (Doctorial thesis presented 
to the University of Leeds, not yet published) Chapter 1. 
2. Parliamentary Papers: Africa. No. 7 (1901) Sir Harry Johnston, 
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Report by His Majesty's Special Commissioner on the Protectorate 
of Uganda (London: H.M.S.O., 1901) Command 671. 
3. Entebbe Secretariat Archives 4806/26. 
4. E.S.A. 5790/6. 
5. Sir Handley Bird, "Uganda Twenty-Five Years Ago". The Kingdom 
of Buganda: Lectures (Kampala: The Uganda Society, 1956) p. 50. 
6. Paragraph 6 of the Regulations defining the Constitutional Duties 
and powers of the East African Currency Board. October 1920. 
Appendix I of the Report for the year ending 30th June, 1921. 
7. Loxley, op. cit. pp. 25, 26. 
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The Uganda Credit and Savings 
Bank 
Though the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank (UCSB) was 
reorganized into a full-fledged commercial bank in October 1965, 
it had been created in the first place with the purpose of filling 
up a glaring gap in the structure of financial institutions in 
Uganda. It had been specifically designed to mobilize small savings 
and to supply capital funds to finance African enterprise in 
Uganda. It was the first experiment in development banking in 
Uganda. 
In this chapter, therefore, we shall review the experience and try 
to assess the successes and failures of this experiment in develop-
ment banking in Uganda. We shall try to discover what principal 
issues arose in the day-to-day operations of the Bank and to find 
out some of the ways in which these issues were resolved. We 
shall also try to analyse the operations of the Bank and to assess 
the efficiency with which the UCSB was able to promote the 
policy objectives which gave rise to its being set up. For the 
UCSB was set up not only to provide capital for African invest-
ment, it was also intended to mobilize small savings, enterprise 
and skills for productive investment in that sector. It will be in-
teresting to find out how viable and effective an institution the 
UCSB was in stimulating African investment, as well as in con-
tributing to the process of mobilizing small domestic funds for 
domestic lending. It will then be possible to consider whether 
alternative proposals could contribute more effectively to the 
attainment of these desired ends of policy. 
Establishment of the UCSB. The kind of background which 
gave rise to the setting up of the UCSB by the Uganda Govern-
ment has already been discussed in Chapter Two. When the UCSB 
The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank 21 
was conceived and set up in 1950, it was an exceptional financial 
institution rather than one following the rule in the whole of East 
and Central Africa. 
The UCSB was established by Ordinance No. 20 of 1950 for 
the express purpose of facilitating loans to African commercial 
and industrial — in addition to agricultural — enterprise. The 
Bank was also empowered to accept savings deposits from Afri-
cans; but it was not until May 1956 that the Bank's Savings 
Section was opened to all races. The Ordinance was signed by 
the Acting Governor on the 26th July, 1950; and on 2nd October, 
1950, the Bank was opened in Kampala for business for the pur-
pose of receiving applications for loans. On the 1st October, 1953, 
a Branch Office was opened in Jinja; and with the setting up of 
the African Loans Fund in 1954, the Bank acceded to the request 
that it should open four additional branch offices in Gulu, Mbale, 
Fort Portal and Soroti. In 1957 a branch office was opened in 
Arua and in 1958 branch offices were opened at Soroti, Fort 
Portal, Masaka and Entebbe Road, Kampala. In addition, six 
monthly agencies were opened at Lira, Moyo, Kasese, Butiti, 
Kyenjojo and Lake Katwe. 
Organization of the UCSB. The Bank was to be administered 
by a Board of Management consisting of the Financial Secretary 
or his representative who was also to be Chairman of the Board. 
Other ex-officio members were to be the Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies or his representative and the Secretary for African 
Affairs or his representative. Not more than seven other members 
of whom not less than two had to be Africans were to be appointed 
by the Governor. These members were to hold office for a period 
of two years. At the expiration of this term of office any member 
would be eligible for re-appointment. The Ordinance was amended 
in 1958 when a post of Deputy Chairman who could act in the 
Chairman's absence was introduced; also, thenceforth there were 
to be nine appointed members whose term of office was to be 
from one to three years and any member would be eligible for 
re-appointment at the expiration of his term of office. 
Otherwise, the composition of the Board remained basically 
unchanged throughout the life of the Bank. However, the desig-
nation of ex-officio members varied from time to time as various 
constitutional changes occurred and as responsibility for African 
enterprise was shifted to various portfolios according to various 
Cabinet reshuffles. At the time of the reorganization of the Bank 
into a commercial banking institution on 8th October, 1965, the 
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Board of Management consisted of the Secretary to the Treasury 
who was also Chairman of the Board — the other ex-officio 
members being the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Co-operatives, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Planning and Community Development, the Permanent Secre-
tary to the Ministry of Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries, and 
the Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Regional 
Administrations. There were, however, only five other appointed 
members to the Board representing the interests of the different 
regions of the country. 
Finances of the UCSB. The liabilities and assets distribution 
of the Bank is shown in Table 3.1. (Note that the figures given 
in this and all the other following tables in this chapter are as 
at 31st December from 1950 to 1954. The figures for 1955 are for 
six months only i.e. from 1st January to 30th June, 1955. There-
after, all the figures are given as at 30th June. Note also that owing to 
rounding in changing Shillings into Pounds, "TOTALS" may not 
add up to the sum of the items.) The UCSB was financed by an 
initial grant of £631,749 voted by the Legislative Council from 
Government funds. This capital consisted of gilt-edged securities 
which were transferred to the Bank at the going market value. 
It was increased by another £311,000 — of which £299,600 was 
realized — in 1963 when the Government accepted the recommen-
dation of the World Bank Economic Survey Mission to Uganda 
that this sum which represented loans originally made by the 
Government from the African Development Fund should be trans-
ferred to the Bank. In practice, the Bank's capital turned out to 
be an interest-free Government loan. However, a reserve fund 
was to be created out of interest earnings on equity capital and 
earnings on other operations of the Bank. 
As already mentioned, the Ordinance establishing the Bank 
also provided for the mobilization of local savings. By 31st De-
cember, 1951, only eight months after the start of operation of the 
Savings Bank section, there were 181 accounts with an outstand-
ing balance of £7,723 (see Table 3.2). By 30th June, 1956 the 
number of accounts had increased to 1,752 with a balance of 
£214,883 outstanding. The number of accounts rose to 50,420 in 
1961 and 82,479 in 1965 with outstanding balances of £1,483,745 
and £2,058,444, respectively. The average sum of money per 
account ranged from a low of £23. 16s. in 1964 to a high of 
£122. 14s. in 1956. 
There was no provision in the charter by which the Bank could 
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raise additional funds by the sale of equity shares either to com-
mercial banks or other private investors. On the other hand, 
though the provision existed to raise additional funds by loan 
capital, this facility was never resorted to. 
However, in September 1954, the Ordinance was amended to 
permit the Bank to act as Agent for the administration of addi-
tional funds on behalf of other bodies and organizations. The 
Banic was accordingly appointed Agent of the administration of 
the African Loans Fund which had been instituted at the same 
time. The initial capital for this Fund was a grant of £150,000 
voted and put at the disposal of African Loans Fund Control 
Committee by the Legislative Council. The capital of the Fund was 
. increased to £218,000 in 1958 and to £308,000 in 1959. A further 
loan of £27,821 was obtained from the UCSB in 1965. This Fund was 
to be controlled through the Agent by the A L F Control Committee 
consisting of two ex-officio members, one of whom was to be 
appointed Chairman, the Secretary to the Board of the Bank, and 
four Africans representing each province. The purposes of the loans 
were to be virtually the same as those of the Bank. 
The Bank was also appointed to act as Agent for the adminis-
tration of the International Co-operation Administration — then 
known as the Foreign Operations Administration — Revolving 
Loan Funds from the United States of America. The first capital 
grant of £100,299 was made in 1954. However, though this fund 
was opened for applications on 1st November, 1954, no loans 
were actually made from it until April, 1958, owing to disagree-
ment over the regulations which would govern the fund. Mean-
while accumulated profits added to the fund were £13,289 and 
the name of the fund had been changed to ICA Revolving Loan 
Fund. On the exhaustion of the original grant, a further grant of 
£50,000 was made in 1961. 
On 31st December, 1959, a second grant of £30,000 was made by 
the ICA and was placed at the disposal of the Uganda Government. 
This capital grant, however, was quickly exhausted and a further 
grant of £50,000 was made in March 1961. This had to be supple-
mented again by a further allocation of £40,000 in 1963. 
It is important to note that in practice these funds were con-
solidated into one operation. As early as 1960, the Board of 
Management said: "In this connection it is now convenient to 
consider as one operation all the funds controlled by the Bank. 
The African Loans Fund and the International Co-operation 
Administration Funds are complementary to the Bank's own 
fund. . . ."> 
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Loans 
Applications. Rules regulating the form of application for loans 
were made by the Governor in Council on 20th September, 1950. 
Applications for loans were to be made in the form shown in 
Appendix 3.A. Where the security offered was a mortgage of 
land within the limits of a municipality or township, the basis of 
valuation was to be similar to that made by the competent 
authority for the purpose of levying rates but with due regard to 
the prevailing prices in land transactions in the area. Outside the 
limits of municipalities and townships valuation was to be based 
on the going prices in similar land transactions in the area. Apart 
from these mortgages of land, equitable mortgages and life 
assurance policies, the basis of valuation was to be left to the 
discretion of the appointed valuer. 
The purposes for which loans could be made were for the pur-
chase and development of land, the discharge of prior encum-
brances on land or liabilities for its improvement, the payment of 
agricultural variable inputs as well as agricultural machinery, live-
stock trade, erection and repair of buildings, the payment of 
certain premiums on insurance, and the financing of any trade, 
business or industry. 
As previously mentioned, the Bank was opened for business on 
2nd October, 1950 for the purpose of receiving applications for 
loans. There was an immediate rush for application forms, 86 
of these being issued on the first day; by the end of the month 
557 forms had been issued and by the end of the year the number 
had risen to 830. Great interest in these forms was kept up during 
the following three years — the volume of application forms 
issued reaching a peak of 2,083 in 1953. In 1954, however, more 
stringent terms were introduced both in regard to closer inspection 
and examination of security and to the Bank's action in fore-
closing on its mortgages on overdue instalments. Moreover, when 
the non-secured or "character" loan scheme of the African Loans 
Fund was introduced in that year, the combined effect of these 
events was to substantially reduce interest in applying for loans 
from the Bank proper. 
Table 3.3 shows the total number of applications and the 
volume of loans submitted to, and the number and volume of loans 
approved and those rejected by the Bank. In the first three months 
of the Bank's operation in 1950, 298 applications aggregating a 
sum of £226,695 were submitted to the Bank. Of these, 166 appli-
cations totalling £41,465 were approved and 132 applications 
totalling £115,185 were either rejected or referred back for further 
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information such as location of the land offered as security, details 
of building plans, audited accounts, etc. There then followed a 
very rapid increase in the volume of loan applications submitted 
to the Bank. This reached an all-time high in 1953 when 1,106 
applications aggregating £624,341 were submitted. Of these, how-
ever, only 357 totalling £102,328 were approved and 749 applica-
tions totalling £437,806 were rejected or referred back. This re-
presented a rejection rate of 68 per cent by number and 84 per 
cent by value. However, the biggest volume of loans was approved 
in 1963 when 205 applications aggregating £589,949 were sub-
mitted and 57 applications aggregating £249,858 were approved. 
Though this represented an approval rate of only 28 per cent by 
number, it represented a rate of approval of 42 per cent by value. 
The highest rate of approval was in 1962 when 70 per cent by 
value of the volume of loans submitted was approved. 
Appraisal of Loans. In the latter period of the Bank's life, the 
usual practice was to send the completed and submitted applica-
tion forms to various Government Ministries — according to the 
purposes for which loans were being applied for — for evaluation 
and appraisal. Application forms submitted for a business loan, 
for instance, would be sent to the Trade Development Section of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for appraisal and a report 
of findings would be forwarded through the head of that Ministry 
to the Board for approval or rejection. The Assistant General 
Manager would study these reports carefully and evaluate them 
especially in regard to security, experience of management, eco-
nomic viability, etc. He had power to turn down any application 
on the spot, especially if he considered the security inadequate. 
It was also in his power to approve loans not exceeding £500 on 
the spot. Loans of up to £1,000 were to be approved by a Sub-
Committee of the Board. Loans in excess of £1,000 were to be 
approved by a full Board. 
Formerly, a tiny team of inspectors had been employed to help 
in expediting the process of evaluating the applications for loans. 
In 1953, a seconded agricultural inspector was able to carry out 
a full year's inspection. A shop inspector was also appointed in 
the month of October of that year; but for lack of suitable per-
sonnel, a private company was hired to act as building inspector. 
One officer was added to this ad hoc agricultural and shop in-
spectors team in 1954; but "due to the difficulty of recruiting 
suitable personnel", only one other man was added to the inspecto-
rate staff in 1956. The Board, however, "was well aware of the 
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need of a larger inspectorate, particularly to assist in the adminis-
tration of the African Loans Fund and every effort will be made 
during the coming year to obtain suitable staff."2 In the circum-
stances, however, this hope was not realized. For in 1957 the 
shortage of inspection staff was "still acute; only one additional 
inspector was appointed during the year."3 But in that year a 
nominal inspection fee of Shs. 10/- was introduced because of in-
creasing inspection costs. No further posts were filled the following 
year or any other year after 1958. Instead, "the officers of the 
Trade Development Section," for instance, "undertook a very 
considerable number of inspections in respect of shopkeeping 
loans."4 This was the transitional period to complete dependence 
on Government Departments or Ministries for the inspection, 
evaluation and appraisal of applications for loans. 
Outstanding Loans. The analysis of outstanding loans is shown 
in Table 3.4. The number of accounts outstanding reached a 
peak of 1,285 in 1953; thereafter, there was a definite declining 
trend in numbers which hit a low of 354 in 1965. The volume of 
loans, however, generally continued to rise in value so that in 
1964 outstanding loans hit a peak of £996,963. The average sum 
of money per account was £231 in 1951; it rose to £238 in 1953, 
started declining thereafter until it hit a low of £209 in 1957, but 
started rising again so that by 1965 the average sum per account 
was £2,741. This is a reflection, bearing in mind the operation of 
the A L F and ICA Funds after 1955, of a policy whereby the 
Bank tended to shy away from small-scale individual loans to 
large-scale basically Co-operative loans. Of the 567 outstanding 
loans, for instance, totalling £249,478 in 1958, three were Co-
operative loans totalling a sum of £180,300. 
The rate of interest charged on those loans ranged from 6 to 
per cent. 
The purposes for which loans were approved in regard to in-
dustrial and commercial financing are shown in Table 3.5. On 
account of the Bank's funds proper, there were altogether 72 
loans involving £283,425 approved for manufacturing indust-
ries; 521 loans involving a total sum of £926,280 were approved 
for the erection of residential and industrial buildings; 572 loans 
involving a total sum of £138,239 were approved for trade and 
commerce; and 111 loans involving a total sum of £148,189 were 
approved for the purpose of purchasing lorries and buses. 
Repayments. A statement of interest and loan instalments over-
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due for which figures were available is shown in Table 3.6. The 
high percentages of loan instalments and interest unpaid which 
reached a high of 33 per cent in 19575— the last year for which 
figures were available — shows that in the early years of its life 
the UCSB encountered serious repayment problems. However, as 
previously mentioned, the UCSB was not slow in tightening up 
its repayment collection procedures. As early as 1953, the Bank 
found it necessary to invoke the powers of sale given under the 
Ordinance and commenced selling defaulters' securities. When it 
was found that the results of the first sales were not encouraging 
the Bank decided to increase the required margin of security and 
clamped down on the number of loans it would approve. Though 
these actions had a depressing effect on the number of applications 
for loans submitted, the repayments position started improving 
and by 1957 the situation was so well in hand that the Board was 
able to report: 
"The loan business of the Bank has now been placed on a 
sound financial basis and represents genuine business without 
inflated risk. The Bank is no longer regarded as the source of 
'free' money which was the unfortunate impression created 
in the years immediately after its establishment and, although 
progress may be slow in extending its loan facilities under 
the more realistic conditions prevailing today, it is at least 
known that such business is sound."6 
The apparently high percentages of total instalment and interest 
overdue in 1957 reflect only the substantial sums of interest and 
instalments unpaid but the majority of whose loans had been 
granted between 1950 and 1953. 
Though the figures were not available for the years 1958-1965, 
the continued success of the Bank's achievement in having loans 
repaid can be inferred from the record of steadily declining pro-
visional amounts of "reserve for Bad and Doubtful Debts." While 
the provision for this was £37,500 in 1957, the provision for the 
same was £25,000 in 1958, £15,000 for 1959 to 1962, £7,500 
in 1963 and only £1,000 in 1964 and 1965. Though during that 
time £6,529 was actually written off in 1959 and another £8,242 
written off between 1960 and 1963, there was no value written off 
in 1965 and £698 was actually recovered and written back in 1964. 
This repayments record of the Bank's fund proper, however, 
contrasts sharply with the record of repayments on the other loan 
funds. Again as complete sets of figures were not available, the 
percentages of loan instalments and interest unpaid could not be 
calculated; it is still clear, however, that the ALF and ICA en-
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countered substantial repayment problems. On the 30th June, 
1965, out of 3,800 total accounts outstanding, over 2,000 accounts 
were overdue representing a percentage of overdue accounts of 
over 53 per cent. Of the £504,437 outstanding at the same date, 
£106,720 were overdue — representing a percentage of 21 per cent 
of the total value outstanding. Again, on the same date, £26,406 
were written off as bad debts. As a result the Funds were virtually 
exhausted and could no longer revolve. 
Andlysis and Appraisal of Operations of the UCSB 
The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank certainly performed a 
positive function in the economy of Uganda. Prior to the setting 
up of the UCSB there was no organized source of long- and 
medium-term capital for especially African enterprise. The UCSB 
in conjunction with other organizations filled in this gap and un-
doubtedly made it possible to launch a vast number of projects 
— many of which were successful — but which would never have 
otherwise materialized. The Bank also, to some extent, seized the 
opportunity of performing a valuable educational function in addi-
tion to offering credit facilities to the mass of people in Uganda 
upon whose enterprise the economic future of the country is 
ultimately to depend. The UCSB therefore was a significant in-
strument of economic development in Uganda. 
Once this has been said, however, it remains to be seen whether 
the UCSB efficiently performed the functions for which it was set 
up. Evidence from Table 3.2 would suggest that the Bank was 
particularly successful in mobilizing domestic small savings. It is 
on the lending side, however, that doubt arises whether the Bank's 
performance in this field proved to be equally efficient. It seems 
that the Bank's lending activities fall into two distinct phases. The 
first phase consists of the Bank's early days when it had close 
contact on a wide scale with many Africans. It is the phase when 
the number of outstanding loans reached a peak of 1,285 and the 
average size of loans per account reached a peak of £238 in 1953 
(see Table 3.4). Lending activities and contact on a wide scale 
then started declining from 1954 and this went on until 1957 
when the volume of outstanding loans hit a low of £152,617 and 
the average size per loan hit a low of £209. This marked the end 
of the first phase. The second phase, starting from 1958 onwards, 
seems to have been marked by a tendency by the Bank to shy 
away from a wide contact with the masses where the risk was 
too large and to gear its lending activities to larger and safer co-
operative business even though one would have thought the com-
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mercial banks were already providing that facility equally effi-
ciently. As previously mentioned, of the 567 outstanding loans 
totalling £249,478 in 1958, three were Co-operative loans totalling 
a sum of £180,300. As a result of these activities, the average size 
of loans outstanding shot up from £209 per account in 1957 to 
£440 in 1958 and rose steeply thereafter reaching a peak of £2,741 
per account in 1965. 
In general, it appears that during the first phase consideration 
of applications had more regard to the suitability of the project 
than to the suitability of the applicant. It appears that the majority 
of loans from the Bank's funds were granted to individuals who 
lacked commercial knowledge, integrity and a sense of business 
responsibility; very few had the ability to keep even the most 
elementary accounting records and many were illiterate or semi-
literate as would be evidenced by the presence of thumbmarks in 
place of signatures on some of the agreements. 
The first phase, however, is particularly significant. It was during 
this phase that the Bank learnt its lessons and developed its 
attitudes and subsequent modus operandi. 
Management. The UCSB being a public bank, capitalized 
entirely from public funds, was bound to have its Board of 
Management weighted in favour of ex-officio interests. But a 
Board constituted with busy civil service members was likely to 
be slow-moving. Apart from the fact that non-official members 
were scattered all over the country the ex-officio members' other 
official duties made it difficult to schedule frequent meetings and, 
in any case, official Board members obviously would have little 
time to familiarize themselves with a whole 1,106 investment pro-
posals as were submitted for consideration in 1953. Although a 
system of Agricultural and Building Sub-Committees was intro-
duced to expedite this volume of business, there was no general 
manager at that time who was responsible for putting into effect 
the policies laid down by the Board. In fact, on 31st December, 
1952, the staff of the Bank consisted of "1 Secretary (European), 
1 Lady Stenographer (European), 1 Lady Clerk (European), 2 
Asian Clerks, 2 African Clerks, 1 Inspector (African — an Assist-
ant Agricultural Officer seconded by the Department of Agricul-
ture), and 1 Office Boy".7 However, the need for competent, ex-
perienced personnel cannot be over-emphasized. It has been 
suggested that running a development bank is not a routine job. 
"It requires skill, judgement and imagination."8 The personnel 
list given above, however, does not give the impression that these 
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people had either the experience, competence or the requisite 
attributes and skills in this field. 
In its early days, and in fact for the most part throughout its 
life, the Bank (on its own account) tended to act purely as a land 
bank granting loans on the security of a clear land title with a 
50 per cent — or higher — margin. But 
"land banks employ a special technical staff of valuers and 
advisers, and this fact not only ensures that the security is 
adequate and that the loan is properly applied, but also be-
nefits the borrower and facilitates economic development by 
reason of the improved agricultural methods resulting from 
this expert advice."9 
However, the UCSB in its early days had no staff of expert in-
spectors and advisers as are usually employed by agricultural land 
and/or development banks. 
Even when the Board came round to appointing a manager .in 
1954, it appointed a retired expatriate commercial bank manager. 
However, "the manager of a development bank", it has been 
suggested, "particularly one which is new and labouring under 
great difficulties, should have a combination of skills that would 
be rare anywhere."10 It is not surprising, therefore, that rather 
than concentrating on an intimate knowledge of the borrower, the 
Bank from its early days started adopting a British banker's point 
of view and placed rather too much emphasis on orthodox types 
of security. The result was that until 1954 when the African Loans 
Fund was introduced, most of the loans were confined only to 
Buganda. This state of affairs was, of course, bound to have un-
desirable political overtones. 
"Furthermore, although the Bank was explicitly designed for 
Africans, the application forms and agreements in use at the 
time were printed in English, and no pamphlet of any kind 
had been produced which set out facilities offered by the 
Bank and explained its methods of operation. The existence 
of widespread illiteracy, demonstrated by the presence of 
thumbmarks in place of signatures on some of the agreements, 
does not excuse this failure to attempt communication with 
that section of the community which is literate in its native 
tongue."11 
This criticism of the Bank was made in 1951. Application forms 
were eventually printed in Luganda but no pamphlet explaining 
the Bank's facilities and methods of operation was ever prepared 
and printed for distribution to the public. This is in sharp con-
trast with the former African Business Promotion which ran — 
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now run by the National Trading Corporation — a monthly 
magazine not only to explain to its clientele the facilities ABP 
had to offer, but also to inform them about various business and 
educational aspects of interest to the small businessman. 
Throughout its life the Bank had only a scanty inspectorate 
staff who acted as valuers. It did not recruit any technical or 
managerial advisers. Yet managerial and especially technical 
assistance has proved so valuable an aid to industry that develop-
ment banks generally offer assistance of one kind or another, or 
hope to be able to do so eventually. The provision of capital 
especially to small-scale enterprise is only one of the two main 
functions of development bank lending. Hence, in the complex 
situation of problems facing small-scale enterprise, a development 
bank will fail in its mission if it attempts to tackle only the one 
aspect of providing capital without also tackling at the same time 
the related technical and managerial problems. Most development 
banks elsewhere have rendered various kinds of technical, man-
agerial and other advice and assistance in addition to providing 
capital to their clientele. 
"Even with limited staff and resources, they can usually afford 
to do something along these lines. If the bank neither offers 
assistance nor arranges to have necessary services made avail-
able to prospective clients, it will very likely find itself fairly 
consistently rejecting applications from smaller enterprises 
and confining its financing to the larger companies, whose 
applications are usually the product of more detailed study 
and greater experience."12 
With regard to the UCSB, evidence from Table 3.4 would seem 
to support some of these remarks. Comparative to figures in the 
first phase, the Bank definitely started concentrating on fewer and 
bigger but safer loans in the second phase. Other loans such as 
those made for the erection of residential and industrial buildings 
would seem to have been particularly favoured as the repayments 
for those loans had proved to be so successful. 
Thus the overall impression one gets of the Bank's behaviour 
during the second phase is that of deliberately trying to emulate 
the orthodox commercial bank practice. Rather than boldly con-
fronting the complex problems of financing small-scale enterprise 
squarely in the face, the UCSB chose instead, it seems, to turn 
the other way of commercial banking, and to leave the small-scale financing problems to other bodies and organizations. Yet onwould have th ught that t is preci ely the pr sence and r cogni-i n of these very problems as su h that gave r s  the concep
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tion and institution of a development bank in the first place. 
The Bank's Costs of Supplying Loan Funds. The data on 
provision of "Reserve" funds and on losses incurred in the 
financing of African enterprise by the Bank is shown in Table 3.1. 
These indicators together with the total amount of £19,983 which 
was written off as "Bad Debts" provide a means of measuring 
risk as a cost element. Moreover, the long record of accumulated 
losses on the operations of the Bank shows not only a rather 
high element of risk but also the high administrative costs which 
were involved in them. But in the light of the social services the 
bank was performing, these costs cannot be considered excessive. 
It was not until 1965 that the Bank was able to wipe out all 
its accumulated losses and to make a net profit of £10,334. And 
by the time the Bank got transformed into a commercial bank, 
net profit had risen by £8,553 to £18,887. This result is not un-
expected bearing in mind the fact that the Bank had for a while 
been operating on rather traditional commercial banking lines. 
However it is no credit to the Bank that when they turned com-
mercial, they were able to wipe out all their accumulated losses 
and to make a profit. 
The other loan funds, on the other hand, showed comparatively 
higher magnitudes of accumulated losses. For instance, besides 
the £12,068 written off as bad debts in respect of the African 
Loans Fund between 1960 and 1965, the volume of accumulated 
losses was £19,406 in 1958, rising to £25,848 in 1961 and falling 
slightly to £23,959 in 1965. 
Table 3.7 shows the service cost element, and other direct 
costs of lending and servicing. It is clear that these costs were 
high because of dis-economies of scale. But high administrative 
costs in which a development bank is bound to be involved only 
raise the question whether it should try to make a profit or not. 
If the main issue is how efficiently the UCSB was run rather than 
whether it made a profit, then it could be said that the UCSB 
was run efficiently since it finally managed at least to cover the 
costs of its operations and to set aside a small amount of reserve. 
But if the viability of a development bank is deemed to be much 
less important than the viability of the enterprises it finances, then 
what is important is the way in which these enterprises are 
financed and whether the organization of the credit facilities by 
the investment institution make economic sense. After all, if those 
enterprises made an appropriate return on the capital borrowed, 
the investing institution would itself earn a fair return on its 
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capital investment. The UCSB's attitude to African enterprises, 
however, as reflected in its policy of lending only to "sound 
business" as quoted above, seems to be a shirking of the responsi-
bility for which the institution was set up in the first place. The 
Bank should have been the first to realize that the African entre-
preneur was not sufficiently accustomed to a monetized business 
and that there was some danger that he might mistake cash receipts 
for consumable income without thinking of debt service, provision 
for depreciation and reserves. Rather than thinking, as a result 
of its experience in the first years, of providing training in tech-
nical, managerial and financial skills, the Bank assumed instead 
a sophisticated clientele who already knew about "sound" busi-
ness principles, had the requisite financial and commercial honesty, 
managerial and technical skills. It is not surprising therefore that 
to the extent the Bank increased their overseas capital investment 
in gilt-edged per cent stocks, they acted as exporters of capital. 
To that extent the Bank did not act as a channel by which funds 
would be mobilized and directed into local investment. 
Reducing the Costs of Lending. It is interesting to note that 
high costs of lending to small business are not confined to African 
enterprise as such or even to developing countries in particular. 
The following quotation refers to the United States: 
". . . the relative cost of lending tends to be inversely related 
to the size of the loan . . . since investigation and administra-
tion costs do not decline substantially as the size of loan 
declines and the risk costs (potential losses) rise as loan size 
falls. Finally, since rejection rates tend to be higher for small 
concerns (because on the average they represent poorer risks 
and, also, because most of them are new customers and need 
to he investigated thoroughly) the average cost per loan made 
(including the share of costs for loans rejected) is higher than 
for credit extended to larger firms. Indeed the cost of screen-
ing acceptable risk among small and, in particular, new con-
cerns is high, as are the service costs. . . . The industrial loan 
experience of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during 
the 1930's indicates that managerial assistance is an integral 
and perhaps indispensable part of a successful bank manage-
ment of small-loan portfolios."13 
The task of reducing costs of lending to small-scale enterprise, 
then, is likely to be a fairly long term one. In the short run, it 
would perhaps be easier to reduce the administrative and servicing 
cost element by enlarging the lending institution and letting it 
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specialize in small-scale enterprise. It would then be possible to 
set up an adequate managerial and technical staff not only to 
evaluate applications for loans but also to give the necessary 
assistance and advice. In those circumstances, the operation is 
likely to be spread over a much larger volume of lending. Most 
probably the reason why the direct costs of A L F and ICA funds 
were so low was due to the largeness of their number relative to 
value. 
However, the costs involved in responsibility for providing such 
general services to small-scale enterprise in addition to providing 
capital, need not be wholly covered from the lending institution's 
capital or income. This would seem to be a reasonably clear case 
for Government contribution. In fact, during the life-time of the 
UCSB, this contribution was provided by Government. However, 
the contribution was scattered over the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries, the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives and 
the Uganda Development Corporation. But there appeared to be 
no clear co-ordination between these service agencies on the one 
hand, and the former UCSB and the ALF and the ICA organiza-
tion, on the other. 
As far as reducing the risk cost element is concerned it would 
appear that the application of some of these measures discussed 
above would have protected and improved the operation of the 
lending institution; they would also have had a favourable effect 
on the position of the borrowers. If a small-scale entrepreneur 
receives adequate technical, financial and managerial assistance 
and advice, the overall efficiency of his enterprise increases and 
the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy is thereby diminished. 
Conclusion. While in its sixteen years of operation, the UCSB 
undoubtedly contributed to the economic development of Uganda, 
it seems that it failed to help in cultivating and providing the 
attitudes and skills which would have enabled small-scale enter-
prise to play its full part in the economy. The solution to the 
financial problems facing small-scale enterprise in Uganda would 
seem to lie not so much in providing more commercial banking 
facilities, as in expanding and improving development banking 
credit facilities and providing technical and managerial assistance 
and advice. For as Geiger and Armstrong have reported: 
"the inadequacy of African managerial and technical skills 
is a major factor in the failure of many public and private 
programmes for providing loans and credit facilities to Afri-
can entrepreneurs, particularly newcomers and those engaged 
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in small-scale activities. It is also the main economic cause 
of the comparatively large percentage of business failures and 
defaults on loans and credit extensions. . . . Even where the 
borrowing entrepreneur honestly intends to service and repay 
his obligations, he may be unable to do so because he has 
not used the funds productively owing to inadequate know-
ledge and skills."14 
A major task of the financial promoter for small enterprise there-
fore should be partly to educate the African entrepreneur in 
managerial and technical skills. Instead, however, on reorganiza-
tion to commercial banking, "the Bank's lending policy now is 
necessarily conservative with safety, liquidity and profitability in 
foremost view, . . ."15 
This kind of policy would seem to leave a lot to be desired if 
indigenous small enterprise is to play the role it is supposed to 
play in the economic progress of this country. Once the import-
ance of small and medium enterprises in the economy of the 
country is recognized, it follows that steps should be taken to 
favour their development and to ensure that the banking system 
directs an adequate proportion of investment funds to this sector. 
These steps should not be considered as acts of favouritism, but 
simply as the right means of ensuring the existence and possibility 
of developing an extremely important sector in the economy of 
the country. 
Thus rather than following traditional rigidities and blockages 
in the channels of finance to small enterprises, banking institutions 
in developing countries should also look upon their role as that 
of initiators and innovators of commercial and industrial enter-
prise. After all, the devices of many of the early banking systems 
of today's advanced nations were often crude, experimental, and 
even reckless at times. Even though such devices are at variance 
with modern concepts of conservatism, liquidity and profitability, 
they were in fact the foundation stones of industrial advance and 
economic progress in those countries. 
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Table 3.2 
SAVINGS BANK A C C O U N T S A N D BALANCE 31.12.51 to 30.6.65 







1951 . . 181 7,724 42.7 
1952 . . 343 12,101 36.3 
1953 . . 520 22,983 44.2 
1954 . . 711 44,238 62.2 
1955 . . 1,027 88,242 85.9 
1956 . . 1,752 214,883 122.7 
1957 . . 8,197 565,261 69.0 
1958 . . 19,558 707,641 36.2 
1959 . . 30,422 1,110,077 36.5 
1960 . . 41,815 1,362,225 32.6 
1961 . . 50,420 1,483,746 29.4 
1962 . . 56,156 1,463,959 26.1 
1963 . . 63,506 1,701,937 26.8 
1964 . . 71,689 1,707,843 23.8 




ANALYSIS OF O U T S T A N D I N G L O A N S 



















1950 n.a. 7,055 n.a. — 
1951 546 126.142 231 — — 
1952 1,099 247,660 225 — — 
1953 1,285 306,312 238 — — 
1954 1,151 252,486 219 — — 
1955 991 215,570 218 n.a. n.a. 
1956 787 168,556 214 n.a. n.a. 
1957 729 152,617 209 n.a. n.a. 
1958 567 249,478 440 1,262 n.a. 
1959 465 343,275 738 2,062 223,484 
1960 434 302,254 696 2,257 206,969 
1961 450 457,785 1,017 2,241 234,815 
1962 377 479,419 1,319 2,046 233,648 
1963 403 864,438 2,145 1,797 244,333 
1964 385 996,963 2,590 2,624 275,407 



















































































PURPOSES FOR W H I C H T H E L O A N S WERE APPROVED 
YEAR INDUSTRIES 
PURCHASE OF 
LORRIES & BUSES 




SHOP-KEEPING & TRADE 
A.L.F. I.C.A. 1st Grant 
Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount 
No. (£) No. (£) No. (£) No. (£) No. (£> No. (£) No. (£) No. (£) 
1950 11 2,910 32 8.150 28 5,310 
1951 13 7.465 — — 112 72.351 — — 156 53,814 — — — — — 
1952 7 5.060 26 26.275 70 61,653 — 147 23,075 2 425 — — — 
1953 7 10.250 16 15,725 35 27,403 — — 120 23.035 1 500 — 
1954 1 600 5 3.600 2 6,520 — 27 3,285 1 20a 
1955 — — 3 4,400 2 5,250 — — 6 465 1 1,000 — — 
1956 — — 1 5,000 15 14.945 — _ 23 5,290 — — 
1957 — — — 19 25.960 „ — 
1958 3 ISO. 3 00 — — 12 10,550 — 8 790 — 
1959 — — 1 1,000 28 24,970 7 10,750c 9 2,200 — — n.a. 52,701 — 
1960 4 49,250 1 448 19 55,040 5 11,190 18 5.075 — — 197 51.350 197 81,1676 
1961 4 6.515 — — 29 25,145 8 39,318 13 9,600 . _ — n.a. 54.889 n.a. 70,800 
1962 — — — . — 33 32,402 5 154,150 9 4,650 — 238 21,930 238 21,930 
1963 8 3.435 — — 22 15.305 7 225,300 5 825 — .—. n.a. n.a. 
1964 4 2,675 — — 43 41,728 4 6,250 3 825 1 (Tanner-
ies) 370 
— n.a. — n.a. 
1965 4 12.650 58 91.741 6 46,250 4 5,700 — — — — — n.a. — n.a. 









a. This loan was made for the purchase of a Palantype Machine. 
. This figure includes £25.567 of loans made by the ICA 2nd Grant, 
c . Prior to 1959 figures for building loans were not broken down into those for residential and industrial buildings. 
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Table 3.7 
AVERAGE VALUES A N D DIRECT COSTS PER L O A N A C C O U N T (£) 
V A L U E C O S T S 
Year UCSB A.L.F. 1st Grant 2nd Grant UCSB ALF<! 
1950 
1951 231 7 
1952 225 5 
1953 238 10 
1954 219 17 
1955 218 8 
1956 214 25 
1957 209 30 
1958 440 198 58 
1959 738 108 95 
1960 696 92 162 114 106 7 
1961 1,017 105 123 108 124 7 
1962 1,319 114 109 110 153 8 
1963 2,145 136 115 73 179 8 
1964 2,590 170 131 90 179 6 
1965 2,741 181 117 76 230 7 
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A P P E N D I X 3 . A 
T H E U G A N D A C R E D I T A N D S A V I N G S B A N K 
O R D I N A N C E , 1 9 5 0 
(Section 29) 
FORM OF APPLICATION FOR LOAN 
Number Application Fee: Sh. 1. 
Date 19 
The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank, 
P.O. Box 331, 
Kampala. 
I/We hereby apply for a loan of Shillings 
(Shs ) for a period of. 
I/We am/are prepared to repay this loan with interest in yearly/half-
yearly/quarterly instalments. (Strike out whichever is not applicable). 
I/We am/are prepared to offer the following security. 
(a) Mortgage on land 
(i) Leasehold or Freehold or Mailo 
(ii) Register Volume Folio 
(iii) Name of Estate 
(iv) Number of acres 
(v) State whether already mortgaged. If so, to whom: 
Give particulars of previous mortgage 
(b) Equitable Mortgage—Deposit of Title Deeds— 
(i) Leasehold or Freehold or Mailo 
(ii) Register Volume Folio 
(iii) Name of Estate 
(iv) Number of acres 
(v) State whether already mortgaged. If so, to whom: 
Give particulars of previous mortgage. 
(c) Policy of Life Assurance:— 
(i) Name of Company 
(ii) Amount of money assured 
(iii) Date of Policy and of last payment of premium. 
(iv) Age of Insured 
(v) Surrender value of Policy 
(d) Charge on Personal Property— 
(Give details on property to be charged and situation). 
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The Financing and Promotion of 
Small Business and Industry in 
Uganda 
Shortage of finance has persistently proved a formidable 
constraint in the promotion of Africans in business and industry. 
Hence apart from the UCSB experiment in development banking 
discussed in the last chapter, other schemes of financing and pro-
moting Africans in business have been tried in an attempt to 
overcome this fundamental constraint. It is the purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, to review the operations and assess the 
successes and failures of some of these schemes. 
Establishment of the Small Industries Development Fund. The 
establishment of the UCSB was closely followed by the establish-
ment of the Uganda Development Corporation in 1952. While the 
two institutions were Government owned and were conceived at 
about the same time, their objectives were radically different. The 
one was designed to promote small African enterprise by facilitat-
ing loans to African commercial and industrial — in addition to 
agricultural — enterprise; the other was designed to promote large 
industrial undertakings in Uganda, usually in partnership with 
outside finance. While the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank was 
capitalized with an initial fund of over £500,000, the Uganda 
Development Corporation was capitalized with an initial fund of 
£5 million; the latter's activities now run into several million 
pounds' worth of business per annum. 
In 1955, however, after three and a half years of successful 
operation of large undertakings, the Uganda Development Cor-
poration found it fit not to be associated in the public's mind 
solely with the development of large projects. This probably 
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would not be good for public relations. The Uganda Development 
Corporation therefore conceived of a small industries project and 
in 1955, set up a "Small Industries Fund" by allocating £20,000 
from its profits which amounted to £263,049 that year. This special 
reserve fund was increased by a further appropriation of £50,000 
in 1957. The purpose of the fund was to provide assistance to 
individuals or groups of individuals in setting up new small enter-
prise or in expanding existing enterprise in conditions where 
normal sources of industrial finance were not available and entre-
preneurial ability was lacking. It was thus not intended to assist 
well developed businesses which had access to other sources of 
finance. Rather, its object was to assist the small man with some 
technical knowledge, business experience and some capital. 
Though in many ways a forerunner of the African Business 
Promotion Limited, the Small Industries Scheme was not geared 
solely to the promotion of Africans in business. For instance, "the 
first £20,000 loan to which no conditions had been attached, was 
rather quickly taken up by two loans — one to a European firm 
which might well have found other sources of funds and which 
did not need technical knowledge."1 The sum of £20,000 could, 
obviously, have served more people or firms, or served persons 
or firms in greater need. It was probably because of this that in 
1957 conditions such as "the Corporation should only enter into 
schemes where technical knowledge and guidance are essential 
features" and that "full publicity should be given by the Cor-
poration to the existence and purpose of the fund throughout the 
Territory" were attached by the Governor-in-Council. 
Establishment of African Business Promotion Ltd. During 
the course of administering the Small Industries Scheme, the 
Uganda Development Corporation made some incidental contri-
bution in the teaching to African loan applicants of some of the 
elementary principles of conducting business. But by 1962 these 
training facilities had not been set up in an organized way though 
the need for a much greater effort in this field had been fully 
recognized. And at that time, the need to encourage the full 
participation of Africans in the country's distributive trades had 
gathered new urgency. The Uganda Development Corporation 
therefore proposed the formation of a new subsidiary to be known 
as African Business Promotion Limited, with a broad objective 
of training Africans in all aspects of business at all levels of 
business employment. This new agency was also to offer services 
to small businesses. Previously, the World Bank had recommended 
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that the Uganda Development Corporation organization should 
have as its main objective the training and development of entre-
preneurs. It had recommended that the Uganda Development Cor-
poration organization should work closely with the various loan 
funds; expand business training schemes; help in the interpretation 
and simplification of business regulations; and create a business 
advisory bureau and commercial services agency.2 It was partly 
with regard to these functions that the ABP was conceived as an 
agency which would provide commercial services to African 
traders. But the fundamental consideration which led to the under-
taking of the exercise was the need to adjust the imbalance in 
trade between Africans and others in the country. The ABP 
would achieve these objectives by employing supervisory staff who 
would assist individual African businessmen; it would institute 
a credit guarantee scheme to guarantee their credit with importers 
and manufacturers, or with shippers and merchants overseas; it 
would give assistance in assessing the market, in the submission 
of indents, on insurance, on freight and clearance, and on how to 
organize storage, sales and costing. These then were the considera-
tions which led to the formulation of the ABP scheme. 
By 1963, discussion had reached the final stages and on 17th 
July, 1963, African Business Promotion Limited was incorporated 
as a new subsidiary company of the Uganda Development 
Corporation. 
Finances of the African Business Promotion. The liabilities and 
assets distribution of ABP is shown in Table 4.1. The ABP was 
originally financed by an initial issue of 2 shares of £1 each which 
were fully paid. The company did not become fully operative until 
1964 when its authorized share capital was raised from £100 to 
£250,000 and fully paid up capital raised from £2 to £25,002. 
However, in the period 17th July to 31st December, 1963, the 
company still made a trading profit of £14,562 from which £5,460 
taxation was deducted leaving a balance of £9,102 unappropriated 
profits to be carried forward. The ABP was initially operated as 
a subsidiary of the Small Industries Development Fund and had 
no personnel and overheads of its own. Since the company was 
appointed distributing agent of many of the UDC products, 
notably Nyanza textiles and cement, it was possible for the ABP 
to make a substantial profit during this formative period. 
Apart from increasing the authorized as well as paid up share 
capital in 1964, retained profits have been the biggest source of 
funds for the ABP. The company made a trading profit of £62,804 
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in 1964 and after providing for taxation, a balance of £39,296 
was added to the unappropriated profit of £9,102 brought forward 
from 1963, making a total of £48,398. Of this, £1,476 formation 
expenses was written off and 5 per cent interim dividend — 
accounting for £1,000 — was declared, leaving an unappropriated 
profit balance of £45,922 to be carried forward. The trading profit 
for the year 1965 was £67,649, and, after taxation of £23,467 and 
an interim dividend amounting to £5,000 which was declared 
during the year, left a consolidated balance of £85,104 to be 
carried forward. A good proportion of these very substantial 
profits was realized from ABP's investment in well established 
firms. However, though investment in these firms proved to be 
such an important means of earning profits, the main intention 
for making these investments in the first place was to introduce 
Africans' participation and thus create training facilities for Afri-
cans in the various commercial fields such as insurance and in-
surance broking, clearing and forwarding, manufacturers represen-
tation business, travel agency business, etc. 
The assets structure of the company shows a very high liquidity 
ratio. In 1963 virtually 100 per cent of the company's funds was 
in the form of cash and current account with a fellow subsidiary 
company. In 1964 and 1965 cash and other liquid assets on cur-
rent account, time deposits and current debts, accounted for 72 
per cent and 81 per cent respectively of the total assets. These 
liquid assets were considerably more than adequate to back up 
credit guarantees of £4,275 and £74,182 outstanding on behalf of 
customers in 1964 and 1965. 
Operations of the SIDF and ABP 
Appraisal of Loan Applications (SIDF). In general, any 
individual or group of individuals in industry or any people 
wanting to set up business in industry, could apply for a loan 
in writing to the SIDF executive, setting out the purpose for which 
the loan was being applied. In addition to the provisions laid 
down in 1957 by the Governor-in-Council previously mentioned, 
four other provisions were imposed by the UDC itself in order 
to safeguard Government's internal guidance. These were: 
"(a) that the application falls properly within the title of the 
fund — Development of Small Industries', 
(b) that the applicant knows what he wants to do exactly 
and has a definite scheme which he is qualified to carry 
out; 
(c) that the applicant has a record of proven performance 
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in business life; 
(d) that the application is not for the development of retail 
trade".3 
"Small Industries" was defined by the UDC as "any project which 
will operate within a loan limit of £5,000 with the possibility of 
a further £2,500 for expansion".4 In the light of experience these 
conditions were subsequently amplified in order to ensure, among 
other things: 
"(a) that there is adequate evidence of (i) necessary technical 
skills, whether by previous experience or by training; 
(ii) sufficient commercial knowledge and experience to 
manage and operate the business and to maintain pro-
per records and books of account; or alternatively of the 
ability to learn, given reasonable assistance; 
(iii) character and integrity of the applicant; 
(b) that a full investigation is made of each application, that 
detailed capital and trading estimates are prepared and 
that these reflect reasonable prospects of success; 
(c) that reasonable security is furnished in addition to a 
charge on the assets to be created by the loan."5 
Also, in 1957, the Board of Directors agreed to establish a 
Small Industries Committee made up of three members of the 
Board, in order to ease administrative problems and ensure speedy 
processing of applications. As experience was gained the standard 
procedure for dealing with applications which finally evolved, 
involved the following routine. 
All new applications were scrutinized by the Senior Executive 
in charge of the Small Industries Scheme. Applications which 
were clearly inadmissible were rejected and the applicant accord-
ingly informed. Applications which were considered as potentially 
suitable for Small Industries Loans were processed by a Small 
Industries Section; each application was investigated by a member 
of this Section's staff in accordance with the principles laid down 
in "Guide to Project Investigation" -— the "Bible" as this docu-
ment was popularly known! It laid down the detailed procedure 
to be followed in making feasibility and viability studies of a pro-
ject and assessing the merit of applications. 
On completion of each investigation, a full report was sub-
mitted to the Senior Executive in charge. It included such things 
as: description of the project, summary of the investigation with 
conclusions, amount of loan and specific purposes for which the 
loan was required, period of grace considered necessary, period 
of loan and method and amount of repayments, security offered 
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and form of security, method of advancing the loan, an estimate 
of follow-up service considered necessary, recommendation, and 
appendices giving factual, financial and costing data. If the appli-
cation was considered to be unsatisfactory, it was either referred 
back for further information or amendment, or was rejected and 
the applicant informed. Applications considered satisfactory and 
endorsed by the Senior Executive in charge were forwarded to the 
General Manager of the UDC for the necessary investment 
authority. 
The Chairman of the UDC has authority to approve loans not 
exceeding £1,000. Loans of over £1,000 but not exceeding £5,000 
have to be approved by a committee of three Directors and loans 
of over £5,000 are approved by the UDC Board. 
The period between submission of application and final grant 
of the loan may vary from one or two months to several months. 
If the amount involved exceeds £5,000 there might be considerable 
delay pending a full meeting of the UDC Board. 
Appraisdl of Assistance to Traders' Applications (ABP). The 
ABP procedure of assessing the merits of applications was essen-
tially similar to the basic standard procedure of the SIDF except 
that the ABP's procedure was modified to suit its special condi-
tions and the kind of facilities it offered. In the first place, ABP 
did not give any loans but only offered facilities outlined below. 
In the second place, ABP assisted only going concerns in trade 
and it did not deal with anyone wishing to set up in business for 
the first time. Hence application for assistance took the form of 
answering a fairly lengthy and comprehensive printed question-
naire. This questionnaire included such particulars as name and 
address of the applicant, type of business engaged in, type 
of legal organization of the business, detailed present value 
of the business, purpose and detailed expected costings and re-
venues of the proposed expansion, the security to be offered, the 
standard of books of account, experience, ownership composition, 
size of family, etc. As the ABP had four field officers — one in 
each Region — plus one field accountant for accounting services, 
it was possible for the ABP quickly to visit the premises of the 
applicant for an initial on-the-spot investigation and to check up 
on the statements given in the questionnaire. Much of the original 
sifting of applications was done at this stage. Applications which 
were clearly inadmissible were rejected at this stage and the 
applicant informed. Any applications considered as potentially 
suitable were forwarded together with full reports, analyses, con-
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elusions and recommendations, etc. to the ABP Board of Directors 
for consideration. Very few applications were rejected at this stage 
since much of the basic groundwork would have been done in 
the field. However, approval of applications was heavily influenced 
by three things: namely, the record of past performance and ex-
perience, the presence of security — usually in the form of stock-
in-trade — whose value had to be greater than the requested 
amount of assistance, and the standard of books of account. 
Another important difference between the procedure followed 
in processing ABP traders' applications and those of SIDF was 
that in the case of ABP all applications were considered by the 
Executive Committee. However, with expansion of the activities 
of the National Trading Corporation into which ABP has now 
been merged, it is considered that the Chairman of the Corpora-
tion will be given similar authority to the UDC Chairman in 
approving applications for loans up to a specified ceiling. 
Facilities Offered by the ABP. The ABP operated five main 
schemes and three main services. The schemes included credit-
guarantees, discounting, confirming, hire-purchase guarantee and 
commercial bank loans; the services included auditing/accounting, 
wholesaling and distribution. 
The philosophy behind the ABP Credit-Guarantee Scheme was 
that most traders operating efficiently and in good localities could 
increase their sales if they carried more stocks. But many were 
unable to obtain credit from their suppliers as the lack of integrity 
in others had resulted in a reluctance to develop credit-trading for 
Africans. Often the suppliers who gave credit only did so in order 
to offload dead-stock. However, a good wholesaler would neither 
cheat nor refuse to give credit if he had some assurance that in 
gaining sales he was not risking bad debts. Nor would he charge 
excessively for his services. 
If the ABP therefore found a good retailer buying from a good 
wholesaler, it was prepared to guarantee thirty or sixty days 
credit supply of stocks against a 1 per cent commission. This 
enabled the retailer to sell all or most of the goods before payment, 
thus promoting his sales and profits. His normal capital would 
still be available for low-sale lines, the credit-guarantee applying 
only to his main lines, i.e. those items which he could buy in 
wholesale quantities from one or two selected and bona-fide 
wholesalers. (A wholesaler/retailer who competed against his own 
customers was not considered to be a bona-fide wholesaler). 
Normally, the ABP did not permit the credit-guarantee to 
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exceed 25 per cent of a trader's independent stocks. However, it 
could allow the guarantee to operate as often as desired, providing 
the total credit outstanding at any time did not exceed the amount 
guaranteed. But as sales and stocks increased, it could increase 
the ceiling of the guarantee. 
The argument for the ABP's Discounting Scheme was that many 
African traders desired to compete in tendering for supplies to 
hospitals, schools, prisons and other institutions but they too 
frequently found that the period between supply and payment was 
too long for them to lay out their precious capital. The business 
therefore passed to the traders with more capital to spare. 
ABP could pay 90 per cent of any account to those traders who 
had successfully tendered and supplied goods to their respective 
buyers, on presentation to the ABP offices of invoices or delivery 
notes certified by whoever was in charge. The remaining 10 per 
cent less \ \ commission was then paid after collecting the pay-
ment from the buyers. This scheme thus brought tendering down 
to almost "cash" business. 
There were hardly any conditions for traders who were in-
terested in utilizing this scheme. What they had to do was to 
apply either personally or in writing to ABP. ABP would then 
write to the institutions concerned asking them to pay the accounts 
to ABP instead of to the trader when the accounts were due for 
settlement. However, the businessmen who wished to make use 
of this scheme still had to submit their books to the ABP Execu-
tive Committee as in the case of the Credit-Guarantee and Con-
firming Schemes. 
Bigger traders who wished to employ direct-importing methods 
and consequently low prices could ask ABP to "confirm" their 
indents. This facility was mainly for traders who were unknown 
to the exporters since these exporters had no guarantee of pay-
ment. The order was passed through ABP who guaranteed pay-
ment on delivery. ABP released the goods to the traders on sixty 
day credit terms. This enabled the trader again to sell his goods before 
payment. The ABP charged a commission of 2 per cent plus the 
bank rate of interest on the capital employed. The ABP's argu-
ment behind this scheme was that the trader would naturally gain 
a considerable increase of profit as a direct-importer unless, of 
course, he bought more than he could sell within a reasonable 
period of time, thus tying down his own capital. The ABP there-
fore advised in every case where it was consulted whether direct-
importing was preferable to dealing through a local manufacturer's 
representative and whether the quantities abroad would attract 
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a lower price. 
The case for the Hire-Purchase Guarantee Scheme was that if 
an African company required a vehicle to undertake essential 
deliveries or remove expensive hire charges on collecting goods, 
the ABP could consider acting as guarantor in a Hire-Purchase 
Agreement. The Finance company or dealer would then usually 
agree to a low rate of interest on the payment of instalments. 
However, the buyer was obliged to produce at least 25 per cent 
of the vehicle cost in cash or a vehicle in part-exchange. Details 
of various vehicle prices and repayment schedules are shown in 
Table 4.2. 
In connection with Commercial Bank Loans, it was only in 
extremely exceptional circumstances that ABP would act as 
guarantor on loans made by the Uganda Commercial Bank to 
African traders recommended by ABP. These would be granted 
at a reasonable interest rate but would never be granted where 
credit facilities could equally suffice. 
In addition to these schemes, ABP provided the services of an 
Auditor/Accountant to African traders on request. The Auditor/ 
Accountant was able to advise on methods of book-keeping, to 
audit the accounts of private traders and partnerships, and to pre-
pare for audit the accounts of Limited Liability Companies. ABP 
charged nothing for advisory services but nominal charges were 
asked for audits and audit preparations. 
By the time ABP was merged into the National Trading Cor-
poration, it was doing everything possible to establish and 
strengthen African wholesale companies especially in rural areas 
where African trade cannot satisfactorily develop whilst Asian 
retailer/wholesalers are the main sources of supply. ABP had 
established eighteen such companies by the time of the merger. 
ABP itself had also started importing for direct sale to African 
traders, particularly goods which had hitherto gone through many 
non-African hands in an extended chain from Mombasa to the 
rural villages. It had imported rice, crockery, cutlery, hardware 
and clothing to the value of £180,000. These goods went direct 
to African companies at true wholesale prices. ABP was again 
itself a main distributor for Nyanza textiles, cement, Chillington 
hoes and other locally produced products. It distributed these 
through African Wholesale Companies and where not possible 
through its depots in different regions. 
By the time of the merger, ABP was also assisting African 
exporters to get established in European markets, particularly for 
fruit and vegetables. Perhaps the next step will be the building 
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up of a National Export Company operating through the National 
Trading Corporation (NTC). The NTC came into being as a result 
of a merger between ABP and the African Trade Development 
Section of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. However, 
though the activities of ABP have been discussed at length, the 
experience and activities of the African Trade Development Sec-
tion cannot but be very briefly mentioned here. 
The Africa,t Trade Development Section 
The African Trade Development Section came into being in 
1955 as a result of a report of a committee of inquiry which had 
been appointed by the then Governor to inquire into, and to make 
recommendations for, the advancement of Africans in Trade and 
Commerce. The activities of the Trade Development Section have 
since been based more or less on this committee's report, 
popularly known as the "Maybury Report."6 The Trade Develop-
ment Section's duties and activities included among other things, 
organizing traders' District shows and courses, both in the Dis-
tricts and at Nsamizi; organizing Traders Associations and Buying 
Groups; guiding and assisting in the formation and registration 
of partnerships and companies; assessing and recommendation of 
loans; and erecting, supervising and administering premises for 
letting to African traders in big commercial towns. 
During its life the Trade Development Section helped in the 
formation of some 315 traders' associations throughout the coun-
try with a membership of more than 3,000 traders. These are 
affiliated to the Uganda National Traders' Association, an or-
ganization that is likely to become a powerful mouthpiece of 
African traders in Uganda. One of the most important functions 
of traders' associations is to enable traders to discuss and make 
representations on matters of common interest. The Government 
or any other institution would find it easy to disseminate informa-
tion to traders through such associations. Moreover, traders' 
associations could prove to be important stepping stones in the 
formation of partnerships and companies which may well become 
the big businesses of the future. 
Apart from traders' associations the Trade Development Section 
helped in the formation of thirty buying groups, forty-one partner-
ships and more than 130 private and public retail and wholesale 
companies. In addition, the Trade Development Section helped in 
erecting, supervising and administering more than 158 trade pre-
mises worth more than Shs. 4 million. These premises were erected 
in various towns in Uganda for letting to African businessmen. 
The Financing and Promotion of Small Business and Industry 55 
As a result of these activities the Trade Development Section 
was able to help in increasing the volume of trade handled by 
African traders. The Section estimated that while in 1958 only 
some £10 million worth or 18 per cent of retail trade was handled 
by Africans, at the end of 1966 some £23 million worth or 42 per 
cent of retail trade passed through African businessmen. 
Analysis and Appraisal of Operations of the S1DF and ABP 
The performance record of the SIDF is shown in Table 4.3. 
In all, 64 small industries have been assisted, involving a total sum 
of £98,051 in loans advanced. This represents an arithmetical 
average of £1,532 per project assisted. However, the individual 
amounts advanced range from as low as £25 to £10,500. The 
list of projects which have been assisted ranges from agriculture, 
forestry and mining through miscellaneous manufacturing in-
dustries to tertiary services such as transportation and hairdressing. 
Of the 64 small projects assisted, 52 were owned and operated by 
Africans and the remaining 12 were owned and operated by non-
Africans. Again, out of these 64 small firms, 46 firms (72 per 
cent) were individual proprietorships and the remaining 18 firms 
(28 per cent) were either co-operatives, partnerships or private 
companies. 
Out of the 64 loans granted, 6 loans (9 per cent) involving a 
total amount of £11,775 — accounting for 12 per cent of the total 
volume of loans granted — were paid in full. Of these 6 firms, 
2 were registered companies accounting for £11,000 of the £11,775 
— the remaining 4 firms being individual proprietorships account-
ing for £775 of the total £11,775 fully paid. Twenty-eight projects 
or 44 per cent of the total projects were failures, partly as a result 
of which £16,638 or 17 per cent of the total volume of loans 
granted was written off. Of these 28 failures, 24 were owned and 
run by individual proprietors; the remaining 4 firms were re-
gistered companies. Among the failures, construction and mining 
carried the greatest weight by volume, accounting for £7,671 or 
46 per cent of the total amount of loans written off. Tailoring and 
carpentry were the biggest culprits by number (8 out of 28 or 
29 per cent of the total failures), accounting for 16 per cent of the 
total amount of loans written off. Thirty-six projects (56 per cent) 
were still in existence at the time of writing and were partly re-
sponsible for the total amount of £43,387 of loans which was 
still outstanding — accounting for 44 per cent of the total volume 
of loans granted. 
There is no doubt that the SIDF scheme of the UDC has per-
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formed a positive function in the economy of Uganda. It has 
played a big role in stimulating and assisting African enterprise 
in the field of small industries. It has made it possible to launch 
a number of industrial projects with African participation which 
would never otherwise have materialized and many of them have 
been successful. In doing so it has played a valuable educational 
function in addition to offering credit facilities to Africans upon 
whose enterprise the economic future of the country is ultimately 
to depend. To that extent therefore, the SIDF scheme of UDC has 
been an instrument of economic development in Uganda. 
It would seem, however, that there is still considerable room 
for improvement. Perhaps the whole concept of small industries 
needs to be revised. There probably have been too many small 
loans lent out to individuals who never were full-time industrial 
businessmen but who took to small one-man-show manufacturing 
industries as a sideline to supplement their income from a full-
time job elsewhere. As might be expected, the consequent lack 
of full-time supervision and attention resulted in a high propor-
tion of failures of such projects. 
Though small businesses in Uganda are really very small, the 
standard of small industries in Uganda will perhaps have to be 
raised. The UDC will perhaps have to raise its investment in small 
industries. For only then will it be possible to acquire some quali-
fied people on functional bases. To successfully launch and operate 
a vegetable canning project, for instance, one would need to have 
a chemist, a marketing officer and perhaps a research officer. This 
kind of project would of course involve bigger loans and possibly 
UDC equity participation to begin with. But people who take 
bigger loans are perhaps better risks as they can afford to hire 
competent and responsible assistants. Assisting this kind of in-
dustrial project would be in sharp contrast to assisting say a car-
penter (or a fisherman) whose only equipment would be one or 
two saws (or one or two boats) and over whom UDC would have 
no control whatsoever. If the UDC, with all its vast experience in 
big industries, should find a small industry project viable, a good 
procedure would be that the UDC gets informed on the amount 
of private indigenous equity capital likely to be forthcoming, so 
that the UDC invests the balance with a view to selling out its 
share capital to Africans when the project had been established 
firmly on the ground, say after five years. If a small industrial 
project shows good signs of promise, then the UDC should actively 
participate in it and have active management in it at least in the 
project's formative years. 
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Table 4.4 shows the performance record of ABP. There would 
seem to be no doubt that the ABP started off on the right foot. 
For in the short space of three years of its existence, the ABP 
managed to bring £500,000 worth of business through its Credit 
Guarantee Scheme alone. This figure is calculated from the com-
mission ABP received from suppliers based on the credit sales in-
volved. Although ABP suffered some amount of defaults, this was 
clearly minimal. Only about one third of the commission income 
was lost to ABP on the honouring of their guarantees following 
defaults. 
However, Bill Discounting was perhaps ABP's best scheme. For 
ABP paid out some £500,000 for supplies to hospitals, schools, 
prisons and other Government institutions and later recovered the 
same amount from Government Departments. Previously this kind 
of volume of business was virtually completely closed to Africans 
as they could not raise sufficient capital to make several large pur-
chases whilst awaiting payments. At the time of writing the scheme 
was understood to be gathering momentum rapidly and it was 
hoped that more tenders would soon be passing through indigenous 
hands. 
The Confirming Scheme, on the other hand, had a rather limit-
ed use mainly because few African traders were big enough yet to 
import directly. But even then goods worth over £10,000 were 
imported by a few progressive merchants around Kampala. 
Through its Hire Purchase Guarantee scheme ABP assisted 
some 22 African Companies to acquire lorries in order to enable 
them to undertake essential deliveries or to remove expensive hire 
charges on collection of goods. 
The operations of ABP reflect correctly the UDC concept of 
subsidiary companies. The UDC emphasizes that its subsidiary 
companies are not scholastic institutions. They are there to make 
profitable operations. Hence the first material principle in the 
training of Africans within business must be carried out at a profit. 
But ABP was extremely lucky in this respect. Accepting the fact 
that the majority of the people of Uganda were not natural 
traders, ABP recruited a staff of thirty officers, eleven of whom 
were in the field and nineteen at headquarters; a further two 
officers were under training at the time of its merger into the 
National Trading Corporation. It also ran three depots: one at 
Mbale, one in Gulu and one in Kampala. 
The bulk of ABP's total revenue was earned from its distri-
butive services and the total wages bill could easily be covered 
from this source. Other sources of revenue were dividends from 
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holding companies and commission charges. These, too, could 
easily have covered the costs of the services. 
Conclusions 
The operations of ABP differed from those of UCSB in two 
major respects. In the first place, UCSB loans were basically 
medium- and long-term loans while ABP concentrated on short-
term credit. The fact that through its discounting scheme ABP 
managed to put such a large volume of business into the hands of 
African businessmen in so short a time, is eloquent evidence of 
the existence of a big gap in the financial structures in Uganda. 
One would have thought that the banking institutions in Uganda 
would have looked on this kind of discounting as "their type of 
business". One would have thought discounting of this nature was 
the normal short-term virtually self-liquidating type of loan that 
the banking institutions traditionally preferred. But either there 
was lack of initiative or it was still felt that African entrepreneurs 
were not safe enough even for this kind of business. It was there-
fore still necessary to create such an organization as the ABP 
to provide even this fundamental facility to African small business-
men. 
ABP was apparently much more successful in its field of pro-
viding short-term credit than UCSB was in providing medium-
and long-term finance to small African enterprise. Guarantee credit, 
for instance, was obviously much less liable to misuse than a cash 
loan of say Shs. 5,000/- which could easily be misunderstood for 
consumable income. Moreover, the UCSB loans were granted for 
a period of years at a rate of interest which ranged from six to 
seven and a half per cent per annum. To budget for premium 
instalment and interest repayments over a period of years pro-
bably required more planning skills than was within the reach 
of most African small businessmen. But with credit guarantee 
there would be no need to budget for this. 
In the second place, ABP, as opposed to the UCSB, had a 
staff of field officers who were constantly in the field. Consequent-
ly, ABP was able to carry out a more detailed investigation of 
applications and subsequently had more control over its customers 
than did the UCSB. The ABP as opposed to the UCSB was con-
stantly able to investigate thoroughly the suitability not only of 
the project but of the applicant as well. But once the UCSB issued 
money to their customer, they had virtually no more control over 
it. For instance, there ought to have been some form of liaison 
between the SIDF and UCSB at least for the former to help the 
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latter on the technical side. But at the time of writing the SIDF 
did not have sufficient revolving funds to continue lending to small 
industries. 
The failure on the part of UCSB to publicize the kind of faci-
lities it had to offer to African small businessmen has already been 
mentioned. This was in sharp contrast to the widely popular and 
informative ABP monthly publication. However, a serious short-
coming of the ABP was that it neither catered for any budding 
beginning businessmen, nor did it cater for any on-going business-
men who wanted to make some medium- or long-term capital ex-
pansion of their businesses. 
1. C. T. Richardson, Final Report, Small Industries Development (April 
1961) p. 12. 
2. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Eco-
nomic Development of Uganda (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
Press 1962) pp. 291-292. 
3. Quoted f rom Henry B. Thomas, Case Studies on the Uganda Deve-
lopment Corporation (February 1963) pp. 3, 4. 
4. Files of the Development Division of the UDC. 
5. Ibid. 
6. See Uganda Protectorate, The Advancement of Africans in Trade 
(Entebbe: Government Printer 1955). 
L I A B I L I T I E S 
Share Capital 
Authorized: 
100 Ordinary Shares of Shs. 20/-
each (1963) 
250,000 Ordinary Shares of Shs. 20/-
each (1964) 
Issued: 
2 Ordinary Shares of Shs. 20/- fully 
paid 249,998 Ordinary Shares of Shs. 
20/- each 
Shs. 2/- paid (1964) 
Revenue Reserve 
Unappropriated Profits 
Current Liabilities and Provisions 
Holding Company—UDC Ltd. 
Fellow Subsidiary Company 
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Furniture & Equipment 
Associated Companies Shares at Cost 
Hogg Robinson & Capel-Cure 
(U) Ltd 
Equatorial Agencies Ltd. . . 
Associated Traders (U) Ltd. 
Nyanza Textile Industries Ltd. 
Uganda Cement Industries Ltd. 
Uganda Crane Industries Ltd. 
Uganda Consolidated Properties Ltd. 
Current Assets 
Stock of Umbrellas and Hoes at 
Cost 
Debtors, Deposits and Prepayments 
Current Account—Fellow Subsidiary 
Company 
Deposit—Ugadev Bank Ltd.— 
Fellow Subsidiary Company 






























16,213 95,775 150,398 16,213 95,775 150,398 
Source: UDC Annual Reports. 
Guarantees Outstanding on Behalf 
of Customers 4,275 74,182 
Table 4.1 
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS 
HIRE-PURCHASE SCHEME W I T H G U A R A N T E E BY AFRICAN BUSINESS P R O M O T I O N LIMITED 
Cortina Cortina Corsair 
1500 cc 1500 cc 1500 cc Zephyr 4 
Saloon Est. Car D/LuxeSal Saloon 
Lorry K. 500 K. 700 Anglia350 Anglia350 Thames 
K./300 5 ton 7 ton 7 cwt. 7 cwt. 800 
3 ton Truck Truck Standard D/Luxe R/Door 
Retail Price (Shs.) . . 
Amount of Depos i t . . 
Net Balance 
Interest 
Total H.P. Balance 
17 Monthly Payments 
1 Final Payament . . 
Discount Payment to ABP 

















































































' Insurance for total period of hire, Licence and Fees, to be paid cash prior to delivery. Insurance to be endorsed with 
Uganda Company s interest and registration to be done in the Joint Names of Uganda Company and Hirer. No vehicle to be hired or delivered 
without a letter of authority f rom the General Manager, African Business Promotion Limited. aeiiverea, 
* ^ h f r ^ f t l T ^ ? ™ ^ 1 1 L ! m i t e ? 5 o U e c t i o ? °f discount at the conclusion of the credit term, will pass half of the rebated sum to 
the hirer if the agreement has been fully honoured and the account satisfactorily conducted. 
Source: Files of ABP. 

5 
Results of a Survey on the Financing 
of Small-Scale Enterprise in Uganda 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the financial 
problems of small-scale enterprise in Uganda basically from the 
point of view of the entrepreneurs themselves and only partially 
from that of the economist. It presents the results of an inquiry 
into the financial affairs of small-scale enterprise in Uganda which 
was carried out in June, July and August, 1966. It gives some 
factual information on the main sources of funds available to 
small firms in Uganda and the uses to which these funds have 
been put by the entrepreneurs. It also gives some idea about orders 
of magnitude of demand for funds as seen by the small entrepre-
neurs themselves. In this examination, however, we do not attempt 
to make any comprehensive analysis of the projects involved, from 
the standpoint of assessing the economic viability of these projects. 
Nor has the analysis of the data from the survey been elaborate 
or statistical. Rather, the results are presented as a description of 
the salient features which, it is hoped, will provide a base for dis-
cussion of the important practical problems involved. But practical 
problems are still of much interest as statistical elaborations. 
The Survey. The inquiry into the financial and other problems 
of small enterprise in Uganda was carried out by means of a sur-
vey. Experience, however, had already shown that the response 
rate of small firms to a mail survey type of questionnaire was very 
low and that the quality of the answers from small firms was poor.1 
It was therefore decided to conduct the survey on an interview 
basis with the interviewers going to the premises of firms and 
conducting the interview on the spot. The interview was conducted 
from a printed questionnaire (shown in Appendix 5.A) which 
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contained questions dealing with the general characteristics of the 
firm, employment levels, the sources and uses of funds, the present 
demand for capital funds and planned sources of the same; the 
questionnaire also contained a number of miscellaneous questions 
which dealt with such aspects as market structure, outstanding 
problems, the role of government and constraints to expansion. 
One of the main objectives of the survey was the collection of 
accounts from many small firms who do not have the obligation 
to file these accounts with the Registrar of Companies. In the 
event, however, this aim proved to be impossible to achieve. For 
out of 228 small firms who agreed to answer the questionnaire, 
only a few firms were willing to attach the balance sheet and profit 
and loss statements for the previous accounting year. There is thus 
no independent check on the accuracy of the figures reported in 
the survey. To what extent, therefore, the data collected give a 
true and fair picture of the actual state of affairs is difficult to 
ascertain. At best, the data collected was approximate and the 
picture of the financial state of affairs in this sector, drawn from 
such data, can only be approximate. Under the circumstances, 
therefore, no pretence was made to calculate such potentially inter-
esting aggregate measures as growth rates, output, value added or 
productivity in this sector of the economy. 
A second main objective of the survey was the collection of 
non-financial "demographic" information about the behaviour and 
background of small firms in Uganda. In the event, results on this 
aspect were considerably more valuable than the quantitative data. 
The Sample 
Selection. The problems and difficulties of defining a small-
scale enterprise have already been discussed in Chapter One. It had 
at first been suggested that a good working definition for small 
enterprises in Uganda would be one emphasizing those firms which 
did not have access to international and local money and capital 
markets. In practice, however, this definition soon proved to be not 
so workable as had been hoped, and instead an employment mea-
sure was chosen. But since a financial definition was also necessary, 
it was decided to draw the line at £50,000 of capital investment. 
On the basis of this definition a sample pilot survey of forty-two 
firms was carried out in April, 1966. This sample which was strati-
fied only by location and capital investment was selected from a 
sampling frame of some 2,400 private companies whose data were 
extracted from the Registrar of Companies. However, this original 
sampling frame of 2,400 firms had to be abandoned because of in-
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herent defects discovered as a result of the pilot survey. For, among 
other things, out of the forty-two firms in the sample, eight had 
long closed down their businesses — some of these had closed 
their businesses down as far back as four years ago — and five 
others were not known at the addresses given. Hence 31% of 
the sample had been rendered useless because of defects in the 
frame of reference. This frame of reference had therefore to be 
abandoned. 
A more comprehensive and more up-to-date list of small enter-
prises was therefore subsequently drawn up. This comprised 2,686 
firms, 1,377 of which (51%) were located in the Buganda Region, 
806 (30%) in the Eastern Region, 269 (10%) in the Western Re-
gion and 234 (9%) in the Northern Region. Thus 81% of the total 
firms in this sector was located in Buganda and Eastern Regions. 
But owing to practical limitations, this sampling frame had to be 
reduced to 1,564 firms which were located in the Masaka — 
Kampala — Jinja area, and in Soroti, Gulu and Mbarara towns. 
It was from this list that a random sample of 522 firms was finally 
drawn. The final sample was then stratified by size. It comprised 
356 (68%) very small firms (consisting of 220 firms (42%) employ-
ing 1-4 persons and 136 firms (26%) employing 5-9 persons), and 
166 medium small firms (32%), consisting of 93 firms (18%) 
employing 10-24 persons and 73 firms (14%) employing over 25 
persons. 
No attempt was made to stratify the sample by industry. How-
ever, the composition of the sample by industry is given in Table 
5.1a. An attempt to stratify the sample by racial ownership was 
given up when it was realized that the racial identity of ownership 
could not be ascertained from the business name of the firm. How-
ever, the racial ownership of those firms who responded to the 
questionnaire is given in Table 5.4. 
The response to the questionnaire was about as good as could 
have been expected under the circumstances. Of the 522 firms 
visited, 97 firms (18.6%) either flatly refused to co-operate or gave 
such little information that it was of no use; 20 firms (3.8%) had 
closed down their businesses and another 46 firms (8.8%) were 
subsequently found to be either too big or international companies 
and were accordingly excluded. Another 85 firms (16.3%) were 
excluded for various other reasons: lack of communication, for 
instance, between interviewer and management or because of dupli-
cation when a firm would be found to have been covered under an-
other name. This left an effective sample of 228 firms representing 
a response rate of 43.7%. These responses, however, consisted 
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of different degrees of co-operativeness. 
Some Characteristics of the Sample 
In a study of this kind, the characteristics that need to be 
examined include such basic classifications as: type of industry; 
various measures of size and rates of growth; turnover; market 
structure; age structure; and ownership and control. However, 
owing to the difficulties already mentioned, the requisite data re-
garding some of these were either very approximate or non-obtain-
able. Nevertheless, the following few paragraphs will, perhaps, 
give a general idea about the characteristics of small enterprise in 
Uganda. 
Size. As previously mentioned, it was the employment measure 
which was chosen as the most suitable basic classification in draw-
ing up the sample. But a few other ex post measures of size were 
also examined. Table 5.2a shows the size distribution of the sam-
ple by employment measure. There was one firm in the sample 
which employed only one person; 73 firms comprising 32% of the 
sample employed between 2 and 4 persons. This group employed 
222 people accounting for 10% of the total employment in the 
sample. Another 70 firms (31%) employed between 5 and 9 and 
were responsible for employing 450 people — accounting for 20% 
of the total employment in the sample. These two groups are the 
ones which have been referred to as the "very" small firms. The 
other two groups, employing between 10 and 24, and 25 and 49 
persons, respectively, have been referred to as the "medium" small 
firms. Though constituting only a third of the sample, the medium 
small firms employed approximately 70% of the total employment 
in the sample. Hence, the very small firms constituting about two-
thirds of the sample, employed less than a third of the total labour 
force in the sample. Of the small section of firms in the sample 
who declined to reveal the level of their employment, four were 
in the very small and two in the medium small group, respectively. 
The size distribution using gross assets as a measure, is given 
in Table 5.2b for the 182 firms who responded to the question 
regarding their total gross assets. Of these, there were 10 firms 
whose gross assets were less than £250 — the total value of 
their assets being £1,760. They owned less than 0.1% of the 
total assets of the responding firms. About one-third of the 
responding firms had assets ranging between £750 and £4,500 but 
owned 5.6% of the total assets. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the 
responding firms had assets of less than £10,000 and owned only 
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16.7% of the total assets. The remaining 83.3% of the assets was 
owned by one-third of the medium small firms. In particular, 8 
firms who had assets of over £50,000 owned almost 30% of the 
total assets reported. 
Table 5.2c shows the size distribution of firms in the sample 
using turnover as a size measure. There were 202 firms who res-
ponded to the question on approximate annual turnover. Of these, 
6 firms reported an annual turnover of less than £750 and 39 firms 
reported a turnover of between £750 and £5,000. The largest num-
ber of firms (28.7%) however, reported a turnover of between 
£5,000 and £25,000. Just a little over two-thirds of the responding 
firms had an annual turnover of less than £25,000 but they ac-
counted for only 15.9% of the total volume of sales. The remaining 
84% of the total volume of turnover was accounted for by the 
little less than one-third medium small firms. In particular, 14 
firms whose turnover was £100,000 and over accounted for nearly 
50% of the whole volume of turnover. 
It is significant that the ranking of firms varied very little with 
the size measure chosen, and this is probably what matters most 
in a study of this kind. It would, of course, have been ideal if 
measures in terms of output or value added had also been possible; 
and in a financial study, perhaps a financial measure such as gross 
total assets is the more appropriate measure but it was the employ-
ment measure — with its shortcomings — which probably gave 
the firmest and most accurate figures. As has been mentioned, 
virtually all respondents refused to hand over their accounts. The 
assets and turnover figures were always approximate and perhaps 
in some cases no more than mere guesses. There was, for instance, 
one respondent who employed 35 persons but who reported an 
annual turnover of £6,000. In one or two other instances the an-
nual turnover given was less than the total credit reported as being 
extended during the course of the year! However, Table 5.3 at-
tempts to consolidate the data on the various size measures into 
one table. The "very small" firms, comprising about two-thirds of 
the responding firms, accounted for 30% of total employment, 
36% of total turnover, and owned 48% of the total gross assets 
in the sample. 
Industry. As far as possible firms in the sample were classified 
according to the U.N. International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion. Table 5.1b shows composition of the sample by industry or 
service. The original sample of 522 firms was drawn up by a pro-
cess of random sampling, hence Table 5.1b perhaps gives a rough 
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idea about size and industrial distribution and the predominance 
of very small enterprises in Uganda. It is clear that the activities 
of small firms is highly concentrated in the wholesale and retail 
trades, which accounted for well over 50% of the firms in the 
sample. Manufacturing accounted for only 25% of the firms in 
the sample. In the manufacturing sector itself, enterprises were 
concentrated in the manufacture of furniture, footwear and wear-
ing apparel as well as in the repair of motor vehicles and cycles. 
Other Characteristics. The field of ownership, control and man-
agement may be one which poses special problems to the small 
firm. Respondents were therefore asked to indicate, not only the 
legal form of the firm, but also some information about ownership 
and management. Of the 226 firms who responded, 89 firms 
(39.4%) were individual proprietorships while 48 firms (21.2%) 
were partnerships and the remaining 89 firms (39.4%) registered 
companies. The 137 registered companies and partnerships were 
owned by 541 persons, 338 of whom were also directors belonging 
to groups of one family. There was only one company with as 
many as 30 shareholders; two others had 20 shareholders each. 
However, 81% of the companies and partnerships were owned by 
between 2 and 5 persons. Of the 205 firms who responded to the 
question on management and educational attainment, 60 managers 
had either attained only primary education or had had no formal 
education at all; 19 had attained a junior secondary education; 95 
had attained a senior secondary education; and only 31 had attain-
ed a professional or university education. Most of the managers 
had gained experience as employees elsewhere in the same or 
similar lines of business. 
The composition of the sample by racial ownership, is given 
in Table 5.4. Of the 225 responding firms, 199 firms (88.4%) were 
owned by Asians; 11 firms (4.9%) by Africans and 7 firms (3.1%) 
by Europeans. The remaining 8 firms (3.8%) were owned by mixed 
races. 
Rates of Growth. Although it had been realized from the be-
ginning how important rates of growth would be to a study of 
this kind (since rates of growth may have an important bearing on 
the financial behaviour of small firms) in practice it was not pos-
sible to get an appropriate measure of any kind. An employment 
measure was attempted when respondents were asked to indicate 
their present levels of employment as compared to their 1961 or 
original employment. The attempt was subsequently abandoned, 
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however, when the question was found to have been misunderstood 
by the respondents. Instead of giving 1961 or original employment 
figure — whichever was the later — respondents tended to give 
levels of original employment irrespective of the date when they 
first set up in business. Another attempt which would have 
measured rates of growth in terms of gross total assets was also 
given up because respondents could not give the appropriate 
figures for the required dates. If it had been possible to obtain 
either of these measures, the over-all picture would not have 
suffered from the absence of data on mortality rates, since only 
surviving firms took part in the survey. 
Market Structure. No attempt was made at obtaining a refined 
picture of market structures in this sector. The application of 
theoretical criteria of the type of Joe S. Bain's studies2 were 
obviously outside the scope of a study of this kind. However, in 
an attempt to find out a little about market structure relating to 
firms in the sample, respondents were asked their opinion about 
the strength of competition in their lines of business, in the follow-
ing terms: "Would you say that in this enterprise you are up 
against strong competition, moderate competition, or no competi-
tion to speak of?". The answers are shown in Table 5.5. About 
60 per cent of the responding firms — mostly in retail business — 
reported very strong competition in their line of business. Only 
about 7 per cent of the responding firms reported that there was 
no competition to speak of in their line of business. 
Age of Business. The age structure of firms in the sample is 
given in Table 5.6. Only 13 out of 225 firms were founded before 
1930 and exactly one-third of the firms in the sample were founded 
in the two decades between 1930 and 1949. The most marked 
feature of the distribution is the concentration in the fifties due to 
general boom conditions in the early fifties. Alternatively, the high 
percentage of the foundation of businesses in the last decade may 
be a reflection of the general relaxation of restrictions on trade 
and commerce and industry started in the early 1950's, and con-
tinued thenceforward. 
Sources and Uses of Finance 
It has already been mentioned, in Chapter One, that the financial 
problem of the small firm has been as formidable in underdevelop-
ed countries as in developed countries — perhaps only more so in 
underdeveloped countries. As previously mentioned, it was this 
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problem which led to the setting up of the Small Business Admin-
istration in the United States in 1953. 
Even as recently as 1959, the Radcliffe Committee3 reported that 
in the United Kingdom the money market did not cater for the 
requirements of small businesses and commented that there was a 
danger, which it was socially and economically desirable to avoid 
that the growth of small firms might be impeded because they lack-
ed some of the facilities open to larger companies for obtaining 
capital. 
In Chapter One the financial problems of small enterprises were 
identified and three special difficulties facing the small firm were 
also mentioned. These were the inability of the small firm to de-
monstrate its chances of success in order to persuade potential 
lenders; the inability of the existing lending and financial institu-
tions to cater for the special problems involved in small business 
finance; and the lack of knowledge on the part of the businessman 
and his advisers on how and where to get the money. In regard 
to this last point it is interesting to note that in conducting the 
survey, when respondents were asked the question: "Have you 
sought any advice on how to finance your business? And if so, 
where from?", over 95 per cent of the respondents answered in the 
negative. 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to examine the in-
formation obtained from the survey regarding the sources of funds. 
In principle, there are two sources from which a firm may raise 
funds for its day-to-day operation and for expansion, namely: in-
ternal and external funds. Internal funds, which are analogous to 
the savings of private individuals, are raised mainly from the firm's 
own savings and past profits. As previously mentioned, internal or 
external funds can also be classified as long-term, medium-term or 
short-term funds. Firms may raise external long-term funds in the 
form of shares or loans; and short- and medium-term funds may 
be raised in the form of bank credit, trade credit and hire-purchase 
facilities. 
Some light is thrown on the sources from which 185 small firms 
in the sample obtained their funds by examining Table 5.7. The 
amounts, given in the left-hand portion of the table, give some idea 
on the original pattern of sources of funds of these firms when they 
first set up in business. It also provides an interesting comparison 
with the present pattern of sources of funds to the same firms as 
going concerns, which is shown in the right-hand section. The table 
shows that in the sample, share capital was by far the most import-
ant single form of financing new businesses. It accounted for as 
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much as 44.8 per cent of the total funds available to these small 
firms when starting their businesses. This is especially significant bear-
ing in mind the limited marketability — in general, and in under-
developed countries in particular — of the shares of private com-
panies. This is perhaps explainable in terms of the family nature 
of ownership and control of these firms. In fact, not a single firm 
in the sample reported the use of bonds or debentures as a method 
of raising funds. It is also interesting to compare the relative 
importance of share capital and that of single proprietors' funds. 
While share capital accounted for 44.8% of the total available 
funds for financing new businesses, proprietors' own funds account-
ed for over 77% of the funds available for single proprietorships 
(see Table 5.7a). Even as going concerns, single proprietorships 
obtained the bulk of their funds from retained profits and depre-
ciation. The individual proprietor typically started his business 
with less than £25, which he had saved either from previous employ-
ment elsewhere or from another small business and only expanded 
his present business as funds became available from internal 
sources. The single proprietors' contribution to the total sources 
of funds of the responding firms was of the same order of magni-
tude as that of the total short-term credit which commercial banks 
extended to these small firms. However, the commercial banks' con-
tribution to small enterprises in this line is perhaps obscured by 
the fact that trade credit — discussed below — is usually made 
possible only because commercial banks advance short-term 
credit in the first place to importing and wholesaling firms who in 
turn pass this credit on in a long chain down to the retailer and 
final consumer. However, single proprietors' funds, together with 
ordinary and partnership shares, were by far the most important 
sources of funds — accounting for 63.4% of the total original 
sources of funds. But contrary to expectations, loans from direc-
tors accounted for only 1.8% of the total sources of funds. 
The next most important original source of funds for these firms 
was in trade credits, which accounted for 20% of the total funds. 
This is perhaps a reflection of the dominating position commanded 
by trade and commerce in the sample. Trade credit figures con-
trasted very sharply with the figures given under hire-purchase. 
As a form of finance hire-purchase accounted for less than 1 % of 
the total original funds of these small businessmen even though 
12.3% of the total available funds was raised for the purpose of 
purchasing plant and machinery. The conclusion to be drawn 
would seem to be that even when small businessmen wished to 
set up in industry, they found it difficult to raise either short-term 
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funds from banks or medium-term funds on hire purchase terms. 
Yet medium-term funds of this kind have often proved crucial to 
the expansion of small firms, and lack of such facilities has often 
struck fatal blows to small firms. 
Though the original dates of incorporation of firms in the sample 
are different, the right-hand portion of Table 5.7 gives a rough 
picture of the pattern of sources of funds of these firms in mid-
1966. There are some interesting comparisons to be made between 
patterns of financing small businesses as going concerns and when 
they first start in business. Though share capital was still absolutely 
the largest source of funds for long-term capital in the sample, its 
relative importance declined from 44.8% to 29.6% of the total 
funds available. And although share and single proprietors' equity 
still accounted for 40.6% of the total sources of funds, retained 
profits and depreciation emerge as the most important method of 
raising funds for new capital. 
A number of businesses which started operating some 10 or 15 
years ago with capital equity in some cases of Shs. 100/- or 200/-
have managed to accumulate internal funds running into several 
hundreds of pounds. This seemed to be especially true of many 
Asian-owned businesses. But there was also one instance of an 
African firm with two partners who started out with only Shs. 
400/- in 1954 and had accumulated, by 1966, gross assets of more 
than £10,000 through saving and ploughing back past profits. In 
fact, during the process of conducting the survey, it became clear 
that a large number of owners of small businesses were so used 
to this form of financing that the question of expansion did not 
even arise until such time as they had accumulated sufficient funds 
from their own internal sources. Some of these businessmen were 
either too proud to finance their businesses from any external 
source or they had learnt from experience that there simply was 
no other source accessible and suitable for their long- or medium-
term capital requirements. This view is reinforced by the fact that 
retained profits and depreciation, together with equity capital, ac-
counted for 65.2% of the total sources of funds. In other words, 
more than two-thirds of the total funds in the sample were raised 
either from equity capital or from retained profits and depreciation. 
Even when it came to short- and medium-term funds, bank 
credit and hire-purchase obligations accounted for only 8.8% of 
the total sources of funds in the sample. It is interesting to note 
that not only did bank overdrafts remain at around 8%, but also 
that only 27 out of 182 responding firms reported any bank credit 
at all. In other words only about 15% of the responding firms in 
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the sample had access to this form of finance. 
Trade credit on the other hand remained an important source 
of short-term funds for the established small businesses; it was res-
ponsible for 15.4% of the total sources of funds. The figure of 
£350,000 for total trade credits outstanding in mid-1966 compared 
with a figure of £1,592,500 in credit extended by these businessmen 
to customers per annum. 
As far as uses of the original funds are concerned, expenditure 
on fixed assets — land and buildings — was very small, accounting 
for only 5.9% of the total available funds to beginning businesses. 
Only 10 firms of the 185 responding firms reported expenditures 
on land and buildings. Expenditure on plant and machinery 
accounted for 12.3% and the remaining 81.8% of the total gross 
assets of small businesses was held in the form of working capital. 
This again is probably a reflection of the dominating influence 
of trade and commerce in the sample. But lacking detailed infor-
mation it was not possible to break these figures further down to 
stocks and liquid assets. 
As going concerns, small firms held relatively more fixed capi-
tal in the form of land and buildings than in the form of working 
capital. Of the responding firms, 39 reported holding assets in the 
form of land and buildings and this accounted for 22.5% of the 
total assets. Relative to the time of first setting up in business, 
the share of assets held in the form of plant and machinery re-
mained virtually the same at around 12% of the total assets, and 
working capital accounted for the remaining 65.7%. 
Present Demand for Funds. Respondents were asked whether 
they wished to expand their activities and, as would be expected, 
a very high percentage of the respondents tended to answer this 
question in the affirmative. However, it was only the 87 firms who 
had specific plans of expansion and details of how they proposed 
to carry them out which were recorded. Of these, 3 firms proposed 
to expand backwards. Thus one wholesaling firm had plans to 
expand into a direct importation business; the other two were 
grocery firms who proposed to expand into truck farming and 
food processing. Another seven firms proposed to expand towards 
the markets; for instance, one wholesale firm proposed to open up 
a retail store. The bulk of firms (58 firms) however, proposed to 
expand horizontally; they wanted to open up another shop or buy 
a new plot in the same or another town. 
Another group of 24 firms had plans to open up new activities 
which were completely unconnected with their present lines of 
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business. The list of proposed products was long and impressive. 
It included such diverse things as plans to start manufacturing 
cycle spare parts, paper-bags, local asphalt and roofing felt, hosiery 
and textiles, hardware fittings, fluorescent fittings and electrical 
accessories, suitcases, etc.; other plans included opening up shops 
for processing colour films; for designing for locally produced 
textiles; and screen printing. 
These respondents were asked to supply the estimated capital 
costs of the proposed new projects and the proposed sources of the 
required funds. The results are shown in Table 5.8 which sets out 
the demand for funds for the proposed capital expansion as well 
as the planned sources of these funds. It is convenient and inter-
esting first to examine the purposes for which these funds were 
needed by looking at the structure of assets to be acquired. The 
most significant item for which funds were required was plant and 
machinery — accounting for 40% of the total expenditure. This 
contrasts very sharply with the position in Table 5.7 where only 
12% was for plant and machinery and 65% to 82% of the original 
expenditure was in the form of working capital. 
In the present pattern of demand, emphasis is in a different direc-
tion, whereby expenditure on plant and machinery and land and 
buildings now accounts for just less than 60% of the total required 
expenditure. This is probably a reflection of the desire on the 
part of many firms in the sample to switch from trade and com-
merce to manufacturing industries. In fact, one Asian respondent 
asked about his opinion on what Government should do to help 
small businesses in Uganda most effectively, replied that Govern-
ment should encourage Asians who had sufficient capital and 
technical know-how to switch from trade and commerce to manu-
facturing industries in order to leave room in trade and commerce 
for budding African small businessmen. The provision for expen-
diture on working capital, 36% is relatively much less important in 
the present position. 
As far as the sources of funds for expansion were concerned, the 
proposed position did not differ radically, as did planned assets, 
from that presented in Table 5.7. Share capital and internal 
savings would still account for 42% of the total sources of funds 
as compared to 65% in Table 5.7. However, three sources of funds 
would need to undergo some radical changes. The proposed switch 
from trade credits to the hire-purchase obligations, as a form of 
raising short- and medium-term funds, reflects a fundamental 
change in the pattern of activities to be undertaken. Furthermore, 
much of the required working capital would need to be raised in 
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the form of short-term bank credit. To satisfy this demand, the re-
lative contribution from this source would need to change from 
8% to some 26% of the total sources of funds. 
Other sources of funds typically included insurance companies 
and investment trusts and their relative contribution would ap-
parently need to rise from the present about 3% to 8% of the 
total sources of funds. 
Conclusions 
It will be observed that in the absence of any rigorous ex 
ante quantitative determination of effective demand, the phrase 
"demand for funds" has been rather deliberately used. The con-
clusions reached here therefore, differ very sharply from those 
reached and strongly expressed by Sayre P. Schatz, in his book 
Development Bank Lending in Nigeria: The Federal Loans 
Board.* The main thesis which he advances in this book is that 
"the idea of a capital shortage in the indigenous private sector 
of the economy is an illusion created by a large false demand 
for capital; and that what really exists is not an immediate 
shortage of capital at all but an immediate shortage of viable 
projects, that is, projects that all things considered, promise 
to be sufficiently profitable to attract private investment."5 
Mr. Schatz bases his conclusions on the analysis of 290 invest-
ment proposals in Nigeria which were considered by the Federal 
Loans Board during its five and a quarter years of operations. The 
FLB rejected 229 of these on viability and 7 others on security 
grounds. It approved only 54 loans, 10 of which failed to 
materialize for various reasons and the aggregate amount of 
money it lent was only slightly more than £400,000. Mr. Schatz 
therefore lumps the 236 viability and security rejectees and labels 
them one big segment of false demand for capital pointing out the 
fact that a desire for capital was different from an effective demand 
for capital. He also goes on to emphasize the point that lenders 
have to be convinced both of the worthiness and adequacy of secu-
rity offered of a project before an effective demand for capital 
could be said to have been existent.6 
He also goes to great pains to show that there were no political 
overtones involved in the processing of these investment proposals. 
Subsequent events in Nigeria, however, would perhaps not bear 
him out on this point. In any event, by Schatz's standards of 
effective demand, the 532 credit-guarantees and 84 discounting 
loans discussed in Chapter Four would probably have been labelled 
as false demand for short-term capital funds, since in the absence 
Results of a Survey on the Financing of Small-Scale Enterprise 77 
of ABP's special facilities, those very indigenous businessmen 
could not have convinced the commercial banks either of the viabi-
lity of their projects or of the adequacy of their securities even 
though this kind of short-term lending would have been expected 
"to be sufficiently profitable to attract private investment". After 
all, the inability of small firms to demonstrate their chances of 
success in order to persuade potential lenders constitutes one of 
their special difficulties. These difficulties would seem to call for 
special measures of solving them and five years is certainly not a 
long enough period to warrant drawing such final and conclusive 
pronouncements. 
Moreover, the fact that during its sixteen years of operation, the 
UCSB approved loans to an aggregate sum of nearly £2 million 
and the fact that towards the end of its life the UCSB was able 
to wipe out all its losses and even make a profit, is indicative 
neither of there being a false demand for capital nor of the ex-
istence of lack of viable projects in the indigenous sector of the 
economy in Uganda. 
As far as the survey is concerned, when respondents were asked 
the question: "What are the most important factors which you 
consider have prevented your business from expanding?", 55 out 
of 129 responding firms mentioned lack of finance as the most 
important constraint to expanding their activities. Excessive com-
petition which was the second most important constraint, ranked 
rather a poor second — this response being given by only 22 of 
the responding firms. And when the respondents were asked the 
sources from which they were most usually able to satisfy their 
demand for funds, 99 out of 190 responding firms mentioned re-
tained profit as their most important source of funds. But although 
another 70 of the responding firms mentioned bank credits as 
their most important sources, the amounts acquired must have been 
very small as is evidenced from Table 5.7. 
The picture which emerges from the sample is that of a very 
high rate of self-finance. Even share capital, which accounted for 
a high proportion of the total sources of funds, was most usually 
simply a matter of family funds. There was no evidence in the 
sample of a widely held public issue of shares. The evidence, how-
ever, helped to support the hypothesis that small firms in Uganda 
relied a great deal on internal sources of funds for the provision 
of their long-term capital; it was also clear that although trade 
credit provided a significant source of funds, the small firms still 
had to rely mainly on their internal sources of funds to satisfy 
their short- and medium-term requirements. These facts would 
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perhaps strongly support the contention that the expansion of 
small firms in Uganda is probably inhibited by a lack of suitable 
sources of long- and medium-term funds. Such high self-financing 
is no evidence of financial ease in small firms. With the exception 
of a possible small group of firms who may not want to raise 
funds for expansion from any external sources, it may well be that 
the bulk of small firms in Uganda are held back by their inability 
to get long- and medium-term finance from elsewhere. Evidence 
from the sample on the present pattern of demand for funds and 
the planned sources of funds for expansion would seem to support 
this contention. 
Finally, the fact that the businessmen who needed funds in the 
sample were running going concerns and planned to raise at least 
42 per cent of the required funds from their own resources goes a 
long way to show that this was some form of effective demand 
for funds. 
1. See Uganda Government, Survey of Industrial Production, 1963 
(Entebbe: Government Printer, 1965) p. 8. 
2. See, for instance, his book Industrial Organization (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1959). 
3. Report of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 
Cmnd. 1959, 827, para. 932. 
4. Sayre P. Schatz, Development Bank Lending in Nigeria: The Federal 
Loans Board (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
5. Ibid, p. 89. 
6. Ibid, pp. 90, 91. 
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Table 5.1a 
C O M P O S I T I O N OF SAMPLE BY I N D U S T R Y 
Interviews Successful 
Industry Attempted Interviews 
Processing of Cotton and Coffee 
Cotton Ginning 
Coffee Curring 





Bakery Products and Confectionery 
Miscellaneous Food Preparations 
and Soft Drinks 
Footwear and Wearing Apparel . . 
Furniture 
Printing and Publishing 
Rubber Products 
Basic Industrial Chemicals, Soap and 
Other Chemical Products 
Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats 
Glass and Concrete Products 
Metal Industries and Engineering . . 
Engineering 











Restaurants and Cafes 
Hotels and Rooming Houses 
Laundries 
Barber and Beauty Shops 
Photographic Studios 
Oil 10 2 
012 3 1 
022 3 1 
140 4 — 
205 8 
206 7 6 
2091 1 
204 ; [ 
214 J 8 1 
2401 
242 [ 
213 J 26 11 
250 
260 23 10 
280 8 6 
300 3 — 
311 
319 4 3 
312 1 1 
332 
339 4 2 
350 
370 15 7 
384 27 15 
400 19 6 
611 85 26 
112 212 114 
640 4 2 
712 
718 8 — 
713 
714 5 2 
831 
832 3 — 
842 16 8 
843 8 — 
844 3 1 
2 1 
846 4 2 
522 228 
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Table 5.1b 
C O M P O S I T I O N OF SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY 
A N D BY NUMBER EMPLOYED 
Very Small Medium Small 
Industry 1-4 5-9 10-24 25-49 
Processing of Cotton and Coffee 
1 Cotton Ginning Oil 4 3 2 
Coffee Curing 012 1 1 
Mining and Quarrying 
122 1 Metal Mining 
i 
2 
Stone Quarrying 140 i 2 
Manufacturing 
1 Grain Milling 205 5 2 
Bakery Products and 
Confectionery 206 1 2 4 
Miscellaneous Food Prepa- . . 2091 
rations and Soft Drinks 204 [ 
214. 2 3 3 
Footwear & Wearing 240") 
Apparel 242 f 
11 243. 9 4 2 
Furniture 250 
260 8 7 4 4 
Printing & Publishing 280 1 2 3 2 
Rubber Products 300 1 1 1 
Basic Industrial Chemicals, Soap 
& Other Chemicals 311 
Products 319 1 1 2 
Vegetable & Animal Oils & Fats 312 .. 1 
Glass & Concrete Products . . 332 
1 339 2 1 
Metal Industries & 350 
Engineering 370 4 4 3 4 
Repair of Motor Vehicles & 
8 Cycles 384 7 8 4 
Construction 
10 Construction 400 2 3 4 
Commerce 
10 Wholesale Trade 611 38 21 16 
Retail Trade 112 119 57 26 10 
Transport and Communication 
Omnibus Transporters 712 
1 1 718 2 4 
Road Transporters 713 
1 1 1 714 2 
Services 
Theatres 831 
832 2 1 
Restaurants & Cafes 843 7 5 3 i 
Hotels & Rooming Houses . . 843 1 2 3 2 
Laundries 844 1 1 1 
Barber & Beauty Shops 1 1 
Photographic Studios 846 3 1 
TOTAL 220 136 93 73 
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Table 5.2 
SIZE D I S T R I B U T I O N OF FIRMS I N T H E SAMPLE 
No. of Persons 
Firms Engaged 
Employment 
0— 1 Persons engaged 1 1 
2 J> • • • • 21 42 
3 »» • • • • 28 84 
4 >> • • • • 24 96 
5— 9 >» . . . . 70 450 
10—24 »» • • • • 55 783 
25—49 >> • • • • 23 757 
Not ascertained 6 — 
Total . . 228 2,213 





Under £ 250 . . 10 1,760 
£ 250 — 749 . . 10 6,000 
750 — 4,749 59 128,000 
4,750 — 9,749 39 245,000 
9,750 — 24,749 36 559,000 
24,750 — 49,749 20 671,000 
49,750 — and over 8 663,500 
Not ascertained 43 — 
TOTAL 228 2,275,760 
No. of Volume (£) 
Firms 
c) Annual Turnover 
Under £ 749 . . 6 3,000 
£ 750 — 4,749 39 101,500 
4,750 — 9,849 35 222,500 
9,750 — 24,749 58 821,000 
24,750 — 49,749 27 900,000 
49,750 — 99,749 29 1,700,000 
99,750 — and over 14 3,465,000 
Not ascertained 20 — 
TOTAL 228 7,213,000 
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Table 5.4 
C O M P O S I T I O N OF T H E SAMPLE BY RACIAL O W N E R S H I P 
Number Percentage 
Race of Firms of Total 
African 11 4 . 9 
Asian 199 88.4 
European 7 3 .1 
Mixed 8 3 .6 
TOTAL . . 225 100.0 
Table 5.5 
O P I N I O N S O N T H E STRENGTH OF C O M P E T I T I O N 
Number Percentage 
Competition of Firms of Total 
Strong 133 59.9 
Moderate 74 33.3 
None 15 6.8 
TOTAL . . . . 222 100.0 
Table 5.6 






























SOURCES A N D USES OF FUNDS 
ORIGINAL (185 Firms) PRESENT (182 Firms) 
Amount Percentage Number Amount Percentage Number 
3 TO 
Sources (£) of Total of Firms (£) of Firms 
Ordinary Shares 498,500 44.8 71 674,500 29.6 65 | 
Partners' Shares 121,000 10.9 38 148,000 6 .5 30 TO 
Proprietors' own funds 86,000 7 .7 89 103,000 4 .5 58 Oq 
Retained Profits and Depreciation — — 559,000 24 .6 49 ^ 
TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL 705,500 63.4 1,484,500 65.3 i ? 
Loans from Banks 85,500 7 .7 184,000 8 .1 27 S5 
Loans from Directors 19,500 1.8 2 95,000 4 . 2 10 P3 
Mortgages 25,000 2 . 2 4 77,000 3 .4 11 
Trade Credits 221,000 19.9 27 350,500 15.4 48 
Hire-Purchase 6,000 0 .5 3 16,500 0 .7 5 
Other Sources 50,000 4 .5 5 67,500 3 .0 11 -3 
TOTAL 1,112,500 100.0 2,275,000 100.0 TO 
Uses 
Land and Buildings 66,000 5 .9 10 512,500 22 .5 39 ^ 
Plant and Machinery 137,000 12.3 34 268,500 11.8 56 
Working Capital 909,500 81.8 131 1,494,000 65.7 164 b-


















Proprietors' own funds 86,000 77.5 89 103,000 37.9 58 
Retained Profits and Depreciation — — 124,500 45.8 4 
Loans from Banks . . 500 0 . 4 1 500 0 . 2 1 
Mortgages 500 0 . 4 1 2,500 0 .9 2 
Trade Credits 10,500 9 .5 7 21,500 7 .3 13 
Hire-Purchase 3,500 3 .2 2 3,500 1.3 1 
Other 10,000 9 . 0 1 16,500 6 .0 4 
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APPENDIX 5.A 
SURVEY OF FINANCIAL DEMAND 
FOR SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE IN UGANDA, 1966 
A . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
1. Name of your establishment 
2. Postal address: Post Box Post Office 
3. Location of factory or workshop: District 
Town 
4. Type of legal organization of firm (mark with a tick) 
(a) individual ownership (sole trader) 
(b) partnership (c) registered company 
(d) other 
Please state the number of partners or shareholders 
5. (a) What are the main and secondary activities of your 
establishment? 
(b) Apart from this business, are you owner or part owner 
of any other business? (please specify) 
(If so) who manages it on your behalf? 
6. (a) Month and year your establishment started pro-
duction 
(b) Who took the initiative in starting this enterprise? 
How many persons were originally involved? 
How were they known to each other? 
How many partners/shareholders belong to the 
same family? Same tribe? 
(c) Why did you decide to start this enterprise? (esp. 
why this kind of business, rather than another? 
why go into business, rather than any other way 
of earning a living ?) 
(d) Was any technical advice or assistance received 
at the outset? Yes No 
(If so) from whom? 
7. Total number of persons employed:— 
1961 or 
Present Original 
(a) Unskilled (primary educa-
tion or less) 
(b) Skilled 
(c) Managerial and Professional 
staff 
B . PRESENT DEMAND FOR CAPITAL F U N D S 
1. Would you wish to expand your activities? Yes/No 
(If the answer to this question is "no" , you need not 
answer questions 2-4 in Section B.) 
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2. Please give a brief description of any specific object of 
the capital expansion proposed. 
3. What is your estimated capital cost of the new project? 
Item Cost (£) 
(a) Land & Buildings 
(b) Plant & Machinery 
(c) Other items to be purchased 
{d) Working capital 
TOTAL 
4. How would you plan to obtain this Capital? 
Item Amount (£) 
(a) Retained Profits & Depreciation 
(b) Partners' Contribution 
(c) Shares 
(d) Bonds 
(<?) Bank Loans & Overdrafts 
( / ) Directors' loans 
(g) Mortgages 
(h) Trade credits 
(/) Hire-purchase 
(j) Other (specify) 
TOTAL 
5. Have you been able to obtain the financing you want? 
Yes/No 
(If so) from what sources have you been able to satisfy 
your demand for funds? 
6. If not, what attempts have you made? 
7. Have you sought any advice on how to finance your 
business? Yes/No (If so) where f rom? 
8. What interest would you be prepared to pay on additional 
capital? 
9. What do you regard as a worthwhile return on capital? 
C . MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
1. (a) How is the business directed? 
(b) How many directors are members of the same 
family? Same tribe? 
2. Do you keep any books of account ? Yes/No 
3. How is the business managed? (Give brief description 
of experience: record of jobs, activities and previous 
business ventures) 
4. Manager's education: Kind of school 
To what level 
5. Is any change in management proposed? (Give brief 
description) 
6. Who is in charge of the technical aspects of the business? 
(Give brief description of experience) 
7. Is any change proposed in the management of the 
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technical aspects of the business? (Give brief descriptions) 
8. What approximately is the ratio of profit to turnover? 
9. Could you please attach your last year's balance sheet 
and profit and loss statements 
MISCELLANEOUS 
1. Do you give any credit yourself (e.g. by transfer of goods) ? 
Yes/No (If so) to whom do you give this credit? Friends/ 
Relatives/Others 
To what extent ? At what cost ? 
2. Do your friends and relatives transfer any goods to 
you? Yes/No (If so) to what extent? 
At what cost? 
3. Is the ownership of the establishment predominantly 
African/Asian/European/Mixed ? 
4. Would you say that in this enterprise you are up against 
strong competition/moderate competition/no competition 
to speak of? 
5. What do you think are the outstanding problems of 
small-scale businesses in Uganda? 
6. What should Government do to help small businesses 
most effectively ? 
7. Do you expect business conditions in Uganda to 
(a) improve (b) remain unchanged (c) deteriorate? 
8. What approximately is your annual turnover? 
9. What are the most important factors which you consider 
have prevented your business from expanding? 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Amount and Sources of Capital 
1. (a) Original authorized capital 
(b) Original subscribed 
2. Please give details of sources of funds: 
Original 
Item Amount(£) 
(a) Own funds (Proprietor, 
Sole trader) 
(b) Partners' Contributions 
(c) i. Ordinary Shares 
ii. Preference Shares 
id) Bonds 
(e) Bank loans & overdrafts 
( / ) Directors ' loans 
(g) Mortgages 
(h) Trade credits 
(/) Hire—purchase 
( j ) Retained profits & 
Depreciation 
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3. How were your own funds raised? 
4. What are the partnership arrangements ? Written contract/ 
Other (Specify) 
5. Please describe briefly the security offered for items 
e, f, g and h in question E.2. 
6. Please indicate the breakdown of your capital structure 
by type of asset: 
Present 
Item Original Amount(£) 
(a) Land & Buildings 
(b) Plant & Machinery 
(c) Working Capital 
TOTAL 
97 
The Management Problem 
The Sociology of Management of the Small Firm 
In this section of this chapter we try very briefly to look at the 
picture of the sociological and cultural environment in which the 
small firm in Uganda lives and has frequently grown. For in the 
survey of finance for small-scale enterprise discussed in the last 
chapter, one finding which stood out very clearly was that small 
business in Uganda — as in other parts of the world — depended 
very heavily on self-finance. In Uganda, in particular, this was 
true both in regard to long-term finance and in regard to short- and 
medium-term finance. The highly successful Asian small business 
depended very heavily on self-finance — which was also inter-
locking family finance. In other words, family finance was the 
largest source of the highly successful Asian businesses in Uganda. 
The question therefore arises where African businesses are con-
cerned whether this fundamental source of finance for small 
businesses is not a closed avenue. It is for this reason that it would 
be interesting to try to focus attention for a little while on the 
family and business enterprise among the Asians in East Africa1 
and try to compare and contrast this to the social and cultural 
fabric of the African society. 
Dr. Desai's paper on "The Family and Business Enterprise 
Among the Asians in East Africa" might have been headed "Why 
Asian Businesses Succeed in East Africa". In essence he says that 
these businesses succeed basically because of the social organiza-
tion of the Asian family system. For historical reasons, the Asian 
has been more easily able to enter trade and commerce than his 
African counterpart, and, in contrast to his African counterpart, 
the Asian has tailored his business to provide as much for his fami-
ly as for his business expansion. The Asian has been able to mani-
pulate his social organizational set-up for personal gain and the 
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internal solidarity of his society has been not only notional but 
functional. Hence the essence of the success of the Asian business 
has been not so much that of the individual triumph as much as 
of the whole framework of his social organization. 
However, it will here be argued that the conditions in which the 
small firm has hitherto flourished in Uganda are changing in many 
ways — sometimes in radical ways. If in independent Uganda, it 
is desirable to correct the great imbalances in industrial and com-
mercial activities, it should be possible to exploit and manipulate 
these changing social — and political — conditions. It would 
seem, for instance, that as far as African businesses are concerned, 
family finance is not likely to play as fundamental a role in deve-
loping African small businesses as it has played in those of non-
Africans. For it seems that, in contrast to Asian families, most 
African families in Uganda do not have any funds to start off with. 
And, in contrast to the Asian joint family system, the African ex-
tended family system does not seem to be conducive to capital 
accumulation and this is especially so where the small distributive 
trade businesses are concerned. While one of the most important 
functions in the Asian joint family system is the generation of 
capital in business, in the African extended family system the ten-
dency is to regard the small amounts of capital which might be 
invested in business by a would-be budding businessman as avail-
able to meet the financial needs of the various relatives in the 
family. These comparisons and contrasts would therefore need to 
be e x a m i n e d in a lillle m o r e de ta i l . 
The Asians in Uganda, as in the rest of East Africa, with whose 
family system we are here concerned, are a people of Indo-Pakis-
tani origin. Of course, they are by no means a homogeneous social 
group with a social system susceptible to generalized description. 
Nor would the ethnic and tribal groups of the African population 
in Uganda be susceptible to such homogeneous description. But in 
dealing with the family system of the Asians it is useful to divide 
them into three broad groups. First, the caste groups are each 
homogeneous groups in terms of language, region of origin in 
India, culture and actual or potential kinship ties. Second, the re-
ligious groups which include the Hindus, the Muslims, the Sikhs 
and the Christians are multi-caste, multi-language and multi-region 
of origin in India. And third, the linguistic groups which include 
the Punjabi and the Gujerati are multi-caste and multi-religion 
but are unified in terms of culture and region of origin in India. 
The Asians in East Africa are differentiated from Asians in 
India. In India the basic social groups are identified with caste 
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hierarchies which are characterized by dominance and sub 
servience. (See particularly, for instance, William Henricks Wiser, 
The Hindu Jajmani System, Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House, 
1958.) But the different Asian groups and families in East Africa 
are characterized more by mutual rejection and competition than 
by dominance and subservience. 
The family is the unit of social interaction both among the 
Asians and Africans. In the Asian community it is the family 
which aligns itself with others to form the groups for conducting 
corporate activities. In contrast to African businesses, most Asian 
businesses are joint family businesses. But the root of this business 
unit is social and cultural rather than economic. 
"The traditional value system of the Asians (particularly the 
Hindus) emphasises the desirability of living in a joint family. 
A Hindu joint family consists of a man and his descending 
generations or of brothers and their descending generations. 
Those women who come into the family by marriage and those 
who are born into it but are unmarried are also included in 
the joint family. . . . Generally speaking the ownership of the 
family business is joint and is vested in the social head of the 
family, the Karta. the manager. Where the business is part 
of the ancestral inheritance, every male member has an in-
terest created in it at birth and has a right to demand parti-
tion of the family and the joint ownership of the business. A 
person may live and die without breaking up his natal joint 
family but his ownership or share is secure. The shares are 
determined per stirpes and are equal . . ."2 
Implicit in this social organization are two very important func-
tions. First, one of the most important functions of the joint family 
is in the provision of the management of the family business. The 
family is not only a business owning unit but it is a managing 
unit as well. When a business is started almost all but the most 
menial or the very specialized skilled labour is provided by the 
members of the family (women included among them). 
The second most important function of the joint family in 
business is in the generation of capital. The joint family fulfils this 
function by maintaining a joint economy. In the family there are 
joint savings as well as joint expenditure and the family earnings 
are joint and undifferentiated. 
"The manager invests the savings without specific consultation 
with the other members of the family. He also spends on the 
individual members according to their needs rather than pot-
ential shares . . . When in the family a number of individuals 
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have income independent from the business the manager finds 
it easier to obtain credits and other facilities in business. Since 
a family is seen as a unit by the outsiders, the independent 
sources of income are a guarantee of repayment of debt in 
case the business fails. Also the larger the family the firmer the 
social control the Asian society has over it. The large joint 
family has more marriages to arrange, has a larger network 
of kinship through which arbitration can be made effective 
than a small one. Hence it can ill-afford to lose prestige or 
antagonise other members of the society through business 
activities."3 
The joint family is thus a productive unit not only whose man-
agement is centralized but whose resources are pooled together for 
productive purposes. It may spread over a very large area. It may 
embrace a widespread network covering the whole of East Africa. 
Wholesaling and trading arrangements may be made in Mombasa 
simply by incorporating a family member in that town. A whole 
chain of credit may be extended from Mombasa to a retailer in a 
remote trading centre in Uganda without interest since the whole 
operation would be seen as a social obligation. Because of their 
social organization, Asians may have advantages over all out-
siders who might have to employ capital funds at every point in 
the chain. Hence Asian success in business may be explainable not 
so much in terms of individual achievement as in terms of a whole 
framework of social organization. 
However, the institutions and traditional values connected with 
the African extended family system would seem to be in sharp 
contrast with those of the Asian joint family system in East Africa. 
The African extended family often extends to include third uncles, 
fifth cousins and literally hundreds of people. But the extended 
family cannot be regarded as a productive unit in the sense of 
pooling resources together for productive purposes as in the Asian 
joint family system. Nor can the extended fasnily be regarded as 
a social organization fit for generating capital. On the contrary, 
an up-coming entrepreneur is expected to share his success with 
the members of his family who may either mistake his stock and 
sales turnover for consumable income, or tend to regard the capi-
tal invested in the business as available to meet their financial 
needs — to pay a fine or settle a law-suit, to send a young cousin 
or nephew to school, to help in the payment of bride-price, etc. If 
he refuses to do so, he may risk rejection by the family and the 
local community. The extended family thus tends to be a distri-
butive mutual insurance rather than a productive organization. Its 
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orientation and emphasis is not so much on production as it is on 
distribution. No wonder that an up-country African entrepreneur 
is wont to think and speak in terms of omutwalo gwa siringi (ten 
thousand shillings) while his Asian counterpart generally thinks 
and speaks in terms of lakhs (a hundred thousand shillings). 
The conclusion to be drawn seems to be inevitable. While family 
funds and family management have played a basic and funda-
mental role in developing non-African small businesses in Uganda, 
this source seems unlikely to play so big and important a role 
in developing African small businesses. And if it is desirable and 
an important policy objective that great imbalances in industrial 
and commercial activities should be redressed quickly, then it 
seems to follow that the realization of these objectives cannot be 
left to un-aided African family financial and managerial resources. 
It is in this social context that provisions must be made for Afri-
cans to acquire business knowledge, skills, experience and financial 
integrity. This kind of training has been shown to be a necessary 
adjunct to financial facilities. In this connection we must examine 
an important new development — the establishment of the Man-
agement Training and Advisory Centre. 
The Management Training and Advisory Centre 
In Chapter One we found that most Africans who were interested 
in going into small business lacked one or all of the necessary 
qualifications, namely, capital, technical and managerial skills. 
Moreover, in Chapter Three we saw that though the Uganda Credit 
and Savings Bank tried to close the gap in the provision of me-
dium- and long-term capital to African businessmen, one of its 
shortcomings was the lack of any supplementary advisory, or 
technical or managerial, services. The point was also made that 
though some of these services were being provided in one form or 
another, they were scattered over various ministries and agencies 
without any fundamental co-ordination or co-operation between 
them. Again in the preceding section of this chapter it was indi-
cated that it is imperative to recognize or accept the fact that the 
majority of people in Uganda are not natural traders in the sense 
that the effect of the kind of the Asian family business tradition 
was lacking. 
Although it is the thesis of this study that of the related pro-
blems facing small-scale enterprise in Uganda, the basic problem 
is lack of finance, and that technical and managerial problems are 
ancillary, it is still recognized that for a full and rounded pro-
gramme of promoting small-scale enterprise, these ancillary pro-
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blems have to be tackled pari passu with the major problem of 
lack of finance. Training and improvement in managerial and 
technical skills in small businesses assumes a sufficient supply of 
funds whose management can be improved by the training. Indeed 
it was the recognition of the importance of proper training in 
improving the overall productivity by raising the standard of 
business management which led to the inauguration and opening 
of the Management Training and Advisory Centre in Kampala on 
14th July, 1966. For the guiding philosophy of the centre is that 
"no one class of people has more influence on the development of 
the economic and social life of a nation and the raising of its 
standard of living than its managers, whether in industry or com-
merce, in the public sector or the private, in public administration 
or managing their own enterprise."4 
The centre is financed jointly by the Uganda Government and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), a special agency of 
the United Nations. Although its broad objectives are to assist 
government departments and public institutions with advisory and 
training services, to assist industry and other sectors in introducing 
and improving management techniques, and to assist in the raising 
of the standard of skill of workers employed in industry, the centre 
is also specially committed to promoting and developing small-
scale enterprise — particularly indigenous enterprise. It is com-
mitted to prepare Ugandans for managerial, functional and advi-
sory posts in existing and new industries and to help Ugandans 
to become efficient entrepreneurs by providing them with advisory 
services and instruction in management practices. In its short time 
of existence, spanning only a few months at the time of writing, 
the centre had already conducted two small business management 
seminars at Bugungu on the shores of Lake Albert and at Lendu 
in West Nile; the centre had also opened a three day trade exhibi-
tion in Kampala and management training techniques and equip-
ment which can aid the manager were displayed. 
Organization of the Centre. When complete, the centre will 
comprise a team of ten specialists who will be provided by the ILO. 
Of this team of ten, six men had already arrived at the time of 
writing. These six plus another four men came from all parts of 
the world bringing knowledge and up-to-date experience in ten 
different subjects, namely, industrial engineering, management 
accounting, marketing sales, entrepreneur training, supervisory 
training, metal engineering, electrical engineering, woodworking 
technology and mobile workshops. The centre will eventually be 
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administered and controlled by Uganda personnel but during the 
five year term of the project, the ILO specialists will be working 
with and training Ugandan counterparts. This is one feature of 
the programme which makes the centre particularly fascinating for 
the future of small enterprises in this country. For it would be 
ideal to have advisory personnel who are not only technically com-
petent in their fields but who also possess first hand knowledge of 
the cultural and social environment in which the enterprises they 
are trying to promote live and grow. 
The centre is eventually to be governed by a National Council 
whose policies will be carried out by an Executive Board. The 
Executive Board is to be drawn from a wide section of the com-
munity covering both the public and private sectors of the econo-
my and the Board is expected to be in close contact with the re-
quirements of these sectors. The day to day running of the centre 
will be under the control of the Director and Chief of Project. The 
Chief of Project will be assisting and advising the National Coun-
cil, the Executive Board, and his particular counterpart who will 
also be the Deputy Director. The other members of the ILO team 
will have two Ugandan counterparts — one junior and one senior 
— who in due course will qualify for six months overseas training. 
The work of the centre is divided into three sections, namely, a 
consulting and advisory section, a training section, and an informa-
tion and documentation section. There is a fourth section for deal-
ing with the general administration such as accounts, course or-
ganization and so on. The services of the centre are available to all 
sectors of the community, including in particular small enterprise 
in the private sector. 
Small Enterprise and the Centre. As far as small businesses are 
concerned, the centre's experts conduct negotiations with such in-
stitutions as the National Trading Corporation or the Small In-
dustries Development section of the UDC in order to try to tie the 
centre's facilities to these organizations and subsequently to design 
training courses and advisory services tailor-made to fit their parti-
cular requirements. The rationale behind this is that courses or-
ganized in this way are fully supported by the participating organi-
zation or institution and implies that the new learning will be put 
into practice immediately. These courses, however, do not exclude 
non-sponsored businessmen provided that there are vacancies. 
The method by which the centre's facilities are tied to other 
organizations has already been used in many parts of the world. 
The Management Problem 97 
In Uganda the method has already been used in connection with 
the Bugungu and Lendu seminars. These seminars were conducted 
in liaison with the centre and the National Trading Corporation 
and the Co-operative Department and the Forest Department of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives. The courses in 
these two areas concentrated on general management and prevent-
ive maintenance. The preventive maintenance course at Bugungu 
in particular was concerned with fishing craft and small engines 
and it was carried out virtually at the water's edge. At Lendu pre-
ventive maintenance was demonstrated at an African saw mill. 
In the end both the participating agencies and a good number of 
people in the areas were able to benefit greatly from the courses 
partly because the whole arrangement went into action quickly and 
smoothly. 
Essentially the procedure of this method is that the participating 
organization or agency delegates a Liaison Officer and the centre 
delegates one expert to look after that organization's affairs. But 
the heads of both the organization and the centre are still free to 
communicate with each other though this is confined to general 
policy matters and training and advisory service. It is the approved 
policies agreed upon by the heads which are carried out by the 
two delegates, unencumbered by any extraneous matters or com-
plex communications. But the expert at the centre who is looking 
after any particular organization has free access to all the other 
experts for advice and training facilities. 
Another essential ingredient of this kind of system is that the 
centre undertakes to train training officers and consequently this 
becomes one of the main concerns of the Liaison Officer of the 
participating organization. In this way it becomes possible to 
achieve a strong multiplying effect — which is also a conditional 
feature of all the United Nations expert services. Finally, one of 
the most effective instruments for training trainers at the centre 
is the ability at its disposal to bring together a number of small-
scale enterprises at an industrial estate so that one man can be ap-
pointed by the group to liaise with the centre and arrange suitable 
facilities. This kind of arrangement economizes on the use of ex-
perts at lower levels for teaching and training individual business-
men in an almost vocational training atmosphere. 
One of the main advantages of this kind of set-up is that instead 
of a gross lack of co-ordination and communication between many 
organizations and agencies concerned with small businesses, it 
rationalizes co-ordination and communication between them. In 
particular, the top level communication and co-ordination is pre-
98 The Financing of Small-Scale Enterprises In Uganda 
served for policy making while the programmes for training both 
in the field and on the job are made at lower levels. 
With its resources and this kind of organizational set-up, the 
future potential of the centre should be very bright. In particular, 
a combined and co-ordinated effort between the centre and the 
National Trading Corporation (NTC) should achieve some out-
standing results. For the NTC came into being as a result of 
merging the former ABP and the African Trade Development Sec-
tion of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry — both of which 
organizations had already accumulated a wealth of practical ex-
perience in dealing with African small businessmen. 
However, with such elaborate organizational set-up of the centre, 
there is no obvious arrangement for the provision of finance. 
Conclusions 
In the examination and criticism of economic systems it is often 
necessary to judge according to certain desired objectives or ends 
of policy. The post-independence political realities in Uganda 
would seem to show that the long-run generation of economic 
growth is ultimately going to depend on the indigenous people of 
this country. It is the declared policy objective of Government, for 
instance, to double per capita income by 1980. But apart from 
agriculture, in the private sector in the foreseeable future, increased 
African participation in economic activities also means increased 
African participation in small enterprises. These objectives would 
imply therefore a policy of limiting the sphere of expatriate enter-
prise so that economic development will increasingly rely upon 
Government activity and upon African enterprise; and financial 
institutions must be able to finance these two groups. 
It is also a reality that as far as the business classes in general 
and industrial classes in particular are concerned, the successful 
African entrepreneur has hitherto been conspicuous only by his 
absence. His emergence was handicapped by the discriminatory 
structures characteristic of the colonial regime which denied him 
a fair chance to accumulate the varying stocks of risk capital need-
ed as equity. However, if the implementation of current develop-
ment planning is ultimately to rely basically on indigenous effort, 
then any development programme which does not aim at creating 
indigenous entrepreneurial and managerial classes in small enter-
prises is likely to be drawn on shaky grounds. The position and 
function of small enterprise as a continuing economic entity has 
been shown to be beyond question. 
But we have observed that the concept of entrepreneurship as-
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sures three important things, namely, rationality in business for 
maximal productivity and profitability of invested capital; respon-
sibility and carefulness in management and planning; and a certain 
amount of dynamism in economic activity — howbeit a dynamism 
which may be strongly influenced by economic as well as the 
social background. Without these three ingredients, the economic 
life of a country is likely to stagnate and their absence might not 
be made up for by the most sophisticated planning and administra-
tion of the economic process. 
Entrepreneurship is not something innate in any person or com-
munity; it has to be developed by education, training, and a con-
text favourable to its operation. Indeed with its various program-
mes we have discussed, the Uganda government has been a 
pioneer in Africa in initiating programmes designed to stimulate 
and assist African enterprises. These government efforts in trying 
to develop African small enterprises have certainly been outstand-
ing among African countries south of the Sahara and north of the 
Limpopo. But if with such special government efforts and as-
sistance, African enterprise has not developed rapidly and effi-
ciently, then this indicates that either these efforts and assistance 
have to be redoubled or weaknesses inherent in the programmes 
have to be tackled afresh. 
As we have seen, one of the greatest weaknesses inherent in the 
operations of the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank was that, while 
it tried to solve the major problem of lack of medium- and long-
term capital, it failed to help the small businessman with his an-
cillary problems of lack of technical skill and managerial ability. 
The services connected with these problems were strictly speaking 
not banking services, but all development banks have to provide 
these ancillary services in one form or another. Even when the 
UCSB tried to provide these services on an ad hoc basis, the re-
sults were often most disappointing. The secondment to the UCSB 
of civil servants whose mental outlook was not conducive to taking 
risks could hardly have produced satisfactory results. The practice 
failed to develop responsibility and/or involvement right from the 
beginning so that when a businessman failed, the UCSB could not 
point the finger at an Agricultural or Trade Development Officer 
and tell him that this was his responsibility. 
The UCSB has now been turned into a fully fledged commer-
cial bank. But necessary as a National Bank is in Uganda, it is 
regrettable that a development bank of the UCSB standing and 
accumulated experience in dealing with small businessmen should 
have turned "commercial" just at the time when a Development 
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and Advisory Centre designed to tackle the small businessman's 
ancillary problems of lack of technical and managerial skills was 
being set up for the first time. A number of other weaknesses such 
as lack of co-ordination between various agencies are likely to be 
tackled and get solved in the absence of a development banking 
institution whose function would have been specialization in me-
dium- and long-term credit — types of credit which may be crucial 
for the expansion of the small firm. Medium-term credit in parti-
cular, as has already been stated, is the most important type of 
credit for the small firm, since it is on this type of finance that a 
high proportion of the possibilities of development and renewal are 
based and, especially in underdeveloped countries, of starting new 
businesses. 
The problem of short-term finance may be decreasing in import-
ance. With growing sophistication of African businessmen, the 
doors of commercial banks for this type of finance will increasingly 
be opened. Moreover, as the activities of the National Trading 
Corporation become more familiar, short-term finance should 
prove to be a short-run problem. But the problem of medium- and 
long-term finance still remains as formidable now as in 1950 when 
the UCSB was first set up. 
With regard to the recent re-organization of the former ICA 
Revolving and African Loans Funds into a Development Loan 
Fund to be managed by the Uganda Commercial Bank, it remains 
to be seen how successful this sort of arrangement is likely to be. 
The Uganda Commercial Bank's basic concern now is with the 
interests of private depositors and with preserving their confidence. 
For it is impossible to run a commercial bank without private de-
posits and in commercial banking one is in business to make pro-
fits. But in development banking the yardstick of efficiency is not 
necessarily profits. In commercial banking, the guiding principles 
are necessarily conservative, but in development banking as in 
economic development policy in general, the guiding principle is 
essentially change; which requires experimentation. When these 
two differing functions are combined in one organization, the 
tendency is likely to be the development of one at the expense of 
the other. In any event, the personnel of the bank are likely to 
spend more of their limited time on commercial rather than on 
development banking activities. Even if the arrangement was 
successful, the funds of the Development Loans Fund would seem 
too meagre to cater for all the industrial and agricultural medium-
and long-term capital requirements. 
But we need both the training facilities of the Management 
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Training and Advisory Centre and adequate financial facilities of 
a development banking institution. Not only do we need both, but 
the two institutions have to be run together. Provision of training 
facilities for managerial and technical skills need to go hand in 
hand with the provision of financial facilities. Just as financial 
promotion alone has been shown to be incapable of solving pro-
blems of small enterprise, the provision of training facilities in 
managerial and technical skills by itself is equally unlikely to 
succeed without running a parallel programme of providing finan-
cial facilities to the small firm. 
One solution of the problem would be to start all over again 
with a new development bank. After all, with approximately one 
hundred thousand persons per bank branch, Uganda is certainly 
not over-saturated with banking. On the question of financing 
such an institution, the current inquiry into the re-organization of 
the Post Office Savings Bank cannot fail to come to mind. The 
Post Office Savings Bank could be re-organized into a develop-
ment banking institution which would provide a means of mobi-
lizing domestic small savings for domestic investment in small 
enterprises. Outstanding balances in Uganda on the Post Office 
Savings account have been well over Shs. 20 million in the last 
few years; but these funds have largely been invested abroad. On 
the question of costs of starting and operating such an institution, 
it should be remembered that even the Uganda Credit and Savings 
Bank started in a humble way with agency offices in National 
and Grindlay's Bank premises. It should be possible to arrange 
agency offices in places where the Post Office is already established. 
Perhaps commercial banks could even be persuaded to create 
and contribute to a joint fund out of a small fraction of their 
annual profits to be put at the disposition of a development bank 
for lending to small-scale enterprises. Or, alternatively, the com-
mercial banks could be persuaded jointly to underwrite a fraction 
of credit to small-scale enterprises through the auspices of such an 
institution. Or, a joint fund raised by the commercial banks could 
be used to defray some of the basic expenses of running a deve-
lopment bank. 
Judging at least from the experience of all over Europe where 
special medium- and long-term credit institutions have been creat-
ed to cater for the needs of small enterprise, the need for a deve-
lopment banking institution in a developing country cannot be 
over-emphasized. Specialization in these forms of credit for small 
enterprise, especially in underdeveloped countries, ensures greater 
operative efficiency. Even the existence of such a body as the 
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National Trading Corporation cannot suffice since the principles 
on which medium-term credit is based are unlike those for short-
icrm credit. Moreover, the creation of new instruments usually 
marks the start of a domestic monetary policy. After the recent 
inauguration of a central bank, the creation of a national develop-
ment banking institution would seem a logical step forward since 
such an institution would provide a means in the hands of the 
highest financial authorities in the country to control the direction 
and type of credit in the national interests. 
Otherwise it is to be hoped that Trade Associations will develop 
and accumulate funds rapidly enough to be able to cater for the 
financial needs of small enterprise in this country. But although 
the work done in various spheres has been invaluable in many 
developed countries, Trade Associations have to be extremely well-
organized in order for them to provide these services. 
Finally, the financial problem of small enterprise will remain 
unsolved until such time as the public, government authorities, and 
the financial world realize the very substantial collective import-
ance of small enterprises in the economic system and an integrat-
ed programme implemented which is designed to cater for their 
special requirements. 
!. Dr. Rashimi H. Desai has already done considerable research on 
this subject and will soon be publishing a work on "The Asian 
Family as a Business Unit in East Africa". I am heavily indebted 
to him for his unpublished paper on "The Family and Business 
Enterprise Among the Asians in East Africa" f rom which I have 
liberally drawn material for this section. 
2. Ibid, pp. 2, 4. 
3. Ibid, pp. 5, 6. 
4. The Management Training and Advisory Centre, Ref. Paper No. 
201. 67. 0862, p, 1. 
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Innovations in the field of financial arrangements are some of the 
more significant institutional changes which an underdeveloped economy 
must undergo if it is to move from a low level of economic development 
to a higher one. 
This book deals with the financial problems of non-farm small-scale 
enterprises in Uganda and examines a variety of financial institutional 
innovations which have been carried out in an attempt to solve these 
problems. The successes and failures of these institutions and further areas 
of innovation are also discussed. 
It provides a survey of the main sources of funds available to small 
enterprises and gives an account of the major problems and difficulties 
associated with them. 
This work is based both on the practical experience of those financial 
institutions which have taken special measures to cope with the financial 
problems of small enterprises in Uganda and on the results of a survey 
which was undertaken to obtain factual information on the financial affairs 
of the small firm in Uganda. 
It is therefore hoped that this book will be of some practical value 
to all those who are in one way or another concerned with the promotion 
of small enterprises in Uganda. 
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University in 1957. He is also a graduate of Ripon College, Ripon, 
Wisconsin where he obtained a B.A. Degree in Economics in 1963 and 
a graduate of the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, where 
he obtained an M.A. Degree in Economics in 1965. Between 1965 and 
1967 he was a Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social Research 
during which time the present work was prepared. He has since been 
employed by the Bank of Uganda. 
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